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 Maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa, although not a new security threat, has 
grown at an alarming rate in the twenty-first century.  This study compares modern 
Somali piracy with the Barbary Corsairs problem of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries to understand what policy responses might be most effective.  The comparison 
focused on pirate characteristics and motives; targeted ships; attack frequency; hostage 
treatment; counter measures to combat piracy; and outcomes. 
 Financial motivation, level of organization, and viciousness of attacks are all 
characteristics the Somali pirates and Barbary Corsairs share.  They differ in that the 
Corsairs operated as part of a religious war and were culturally and politically different 
from current pirates, targeted different types of vessels, and had fleets that consisted of 
larger, traditional ships.  The lessons learned from Barbary as well as these similarities 
and differences all contribute to formulating the most viable response to the threat of 
modern piracy.  The failure of tribute payments and the diplomatic treaties that stipulated 
for these tribute payments to the Barbary leaders, the success of best safety practices, and 
the necessity for military action to counter piracy are all important lessons from the 
Barbary era that can be applied to the current problem of maritime crime.  Military 
intervention on the high seas is the most viable solution because of the capabilities of the 
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 Piracy has plagued world commerce and global security for centuries.  Despite 
being popularized in the Pirates of the Caribbean trilogy and the satirical cartoon series 
South Park, maritime piracy is dangerous, and a much larger concern than the 
entertainment media portrays.  It disrupts shipping and commerce, and contributes to 
regional insecurity.  A sudden increase in Somali piracy in 2008 captured news headlines, 
and brought to light the major threat to shipping off the Horn of Africa.  The attempted 
seizure of the Maersk Alabama, and its American crew, on April 8, 2009 raised the 
following question:  what can be done to successfully counter maritime piracy?  In 
particular, is military intervention a viable option, and if so, how would it work? 
 Thus far, piracy has proven to be a difficult threat to solve.  Piracy stems from 
opportunity, economic desperation, and a lack of government institutions able to stop the 
crime.  It threatens the safety of ships and crews, and impacts shipping costs, the global 
economy, and regional security.  During the early part of the twenty-first century, the 
major geographic hotspot for piracy was in Southeast Asia around the Strait of Malacca.  
However, as anti-piracy best practices and littoral patrols began to take effect, incidences 
of piracy decreased in the region.  The sheer size of the region off the Horn of Africa, 
combined with the lack of capable law enforcement institutions, makes applying the 
lessons from Southeast Asia to East Africa extremely difficult.  It also makes an effective 




This study will focus on the military response to maritime piracy.  It will use a 
qualitative approach to explain why naval action is the most viable course of action to 
combat maritime piracy.  A literature review will be performed to present the current 
United States policies on maritime piracy.  These will be drawn from statements released 
by the Department of State, the 2005 National Strategy on Maritime Security, and the 
National Security Council’s Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa:  Partnership & 
Action Plan.  When piracy began to flare up in the Gulf of Aden, resources from 
Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), tasked with conducting counter-terrorism 
operations, were diverted to deal with the new threat.  Eventually, a new task force, CTF-
151, was created to deal specifically with the threat of piracy.  The literature review will 
also explain why separate policies are needed to combat terrorism and piracy.  Finally, 
the literature review will introduce alternative policies to combat piracy discussed in 
various journal articles, and explain the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches. 
 A comparative case study, examining the United States experience with the 
Barbary corsairs and its current dealings with Somali pirates, will be conducted to 
address the research questions.  It will introduce the background and describe the conflict 
of each case, and compare each based on the following criteria:  geographic regions of 
activity, characteristics of the pirates, motivations for piracy, the targets, the nature and 
frequency of attacks, treatment of hostages, measures undertaken to combat piracy, and 
the outcomes.  The criteria will illustrate how each of these factors contribute to piracy, 
how the outcomes were determined, and which attempts to stop acts of piracy succeeded 
versus which ones failed.  The parameters focus on the period between 1783 and 1815 for 
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the Barbary corsairs.  For the Somali pirates, the study will focus on the time period 
between 1991 and 2009, concentrating specifically on the period between 1999 and 2009. 
 Finally, the remaining section will focus on analysis of the case studies, and will 
include the alternative solutions for combating piracy, as well as the case for naval action.  
The analysis portion will examine what worked and what did not in both cases, and the 
reasons for success or failure.  Also, this section will look at what lessons can be learned 
from previous experience, and how they may be applied in the future.  In the alternative 
solutions segment, the cases for the use of diplomacy, on-board deterrents, ransom 
payments, and a land-based solution will be presented.  Within each, the positives and 
negatives of the approach will be discussed.  Lastly, the portion on naval action will also 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of a military approach, but will illustrate how the 
United States Navy is better equipped to deal with maritime piracy, and is thus the most 
viable course of action for the United States to pursue. 
 For the purposes of this research it is imperative to differentiate between terrorism 
and piracy, as well as pirates and corsairs, or privateers.  While there are numerous 
definitions of terrorism, those used for the purposes of this research are those provided by 
the United States National Counterterrorism Center and the U.S. Department of Defense, 
which classify terrorism as the following:  
• The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to 
inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in 
the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.1; 
or 
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• Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.2 
 
Modern piracy, like terrorism, has a variety of definitions.  Two are common, one 
outlined in the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, and the other defined by 
the International Maritime Bureau.  By modern standards, piracy is: 
•  (a)  Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a 
private aircraft, and directed:  (i) on the high seas, against another ship or 
aircraft, or against persons or property on board such a ship or aircraft; or (ii) 
against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction 
of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or 
of an aircraft with the knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-
paragraph (a) or (b).3; or 
 
• An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to 
commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to 
use force in the furtherance of that act.4  
 
According to late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Americans, pirates were 
classified as persons who engaged in “robbery or other acts of violence on the 
seas…without having any authority from, and independently of, any organized 
government.”5 
Corsairs participate in the same actions as pirates, use many of the same methods 
which pirates employ, and are different only in that their deeds are sanctioned by their 
government.  They were recognized by the laws of nations throughout the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, eighteenth, and into the nineteenth century based on the following criteria:  
the commissioning of a vessel to carry arms by the government, and the use of these arms 
                                                           
2 National Counterterrorism Center  Counterterrorism Calendar 2009, “Terrorism Definitions”, 141. 
3 International Maritime Organization, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships” definition of piracy in  
article 101 of United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea.  http://www.imo.org/ 
4 ICC-Commercial Crime Services – International Maritime Bureau.  “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against  
Ships:  Annual Report 1 January-31 December 2008.” (January 2009), 3.   




only against states with which their government was at war.6   Corsairs were authorized 
by their respective governments to raid enemy vessels and required to carry 
documentation identifying them as agents of the state, while pirates had no 
documentation, nor government authorization, and were as likely to attack ships flying 
their own country’s flag as they were their enemy’s.7  As such, the pirates of the Barbary 
Coast will be referred to as corsairs throughout this study, as the various Barbary 
regencies sanctioned their participation in acts of piracy, and the pirates of Somalia will 
be referred to as pirates, as the transition government of Somalia does not commission 
their attacks.  The differences in these definitions are important to note, as they have an 
impact on the formulation of responses to the threat.  The options available to the United 
States, while similar in both cases, cannot be successfully pursued in both, due mostly to 










                                                           
6 Ibid, 107. 





Chapter 1:  Literature Review 
 The trend to dealing with Somali piracy in the twenty-first century has involved 
shipping companies paying hefty ransom sums to safely free their crews, ships and 
cargoes.  However, this practice is only exacerbating the problem.  By examining the 
current literature, as well as the United States government’s policies on maritime piracy, 
the alternatives to ransom payments can be evaluated, highlighting the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various solutions, and pinpointing both successful strategies and gaps 
in different approaches.  As U.S. military counter-piracy initiatives began as part of 
Combined Task Force 150, which focused on maritime terrorism, prior to the formation 
of CTF-151, it is important to differentiate between terrorism and piracy in order to 
understand why separate policies and strategies are needed to effectively fight both 
terrorism and piracy.  Therefore, this portion will focus on the literature as it pertains to 
the causes of terrorism and piracy; current U.S. maritime security policy; the policies 
advocated for combating piracy within the literature; the role of ransom payments; and 
the impact of military intervention on both terrorism and piracy. 
 
Causes of Terrorism and Piracy 
 As the nature of warfare evolved throughout the twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first, terrorism became a more prevalent tactic of peoples and organizations 
attempting to alleviate grievances and institute fundamental socio-economic or political 
transformation at the state level, although groups such as al-Qaeda seek a widespread, 
global change.  Starting in the latter half of the twentieth century, an abundance of 
literature has been published identifying the causes of terrorism.  Crenshaw states that 
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there are both preconditions, or particular situations and permissive factors, and 
precipitant conditions that contribute to terrorist group formation.8  Specifically, she cites 
modernity, urbanization, social facilitation, transnational communication, and the absence 
of adequate (state) prevention as factors which enable the creation of terrorist 
organizations.9  Further, she lists that among the direct causes of terrorist group formation 
is the presence of concrete grievances among a substantial group within the larger 
population; this group often feels a sense of deprivation and as though they have been 
unjustly discriminated against.  Another major grievance attributed to terrorist 
organization formation is the lack of opportunity for political participation, highlighting 
the fact that grievances are not entirely socio-economic in nature.10  This final point is 
especially important because, as Crenshaw mentions, terrorism is the result of elite 
dissatisfaction, and tends to be a reaction to what is perceived as unjust government 
actions.11  Finally, she concludes by stating that failure of alternative methods to 
correcting perceived grievances, as well as the existence of favorable conditions for 
terrorist group formation, can drive terrorism because it is viewed as a simple, rapid 
option which brings instant, visible results.12 
 Similar to Crenshaw, Cronin claims that terrorism is a reaction to a perception of 
justice and is political in nature.13  It is a reaction to empires, colonial powers, and the 
U.S.-led international system marked by globalism14 that targets governments, their 
                                                           
8 Martha Crenshaw,  “The Causes of Terrorism.”  Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981):  381. 
9 Ibid, 381-382. 
10 Ibid, 383-384. 
11 Ibid, 384. 
12 Ibid, 388-389. 
13 Audrey Kurth Cronin,  “Behind the Curve:  Globalization and International Terrorism.”  International 
 Security 27, no.3 (Winter 2002-2003):  33. 




publics and their constituents.15  Cronin cites David Rapoport’s four waves of modern 
terrorism (anarchist, anti-colonial, leftist, and religious),16 focusing mainly on his 
argument that this fourth wave, while certainly having a religious characteristic, is more 
of a power struggle between central versus local and modern versus traditional powers.  
Cronin builds on this notion, claiming that modern terrorism, even that which is 
religiously inspired, is part of a broader sense of anti-globalization, and a reaction to the 
disparity between the “have and have-not nations, as well as between the elite and 
underprivileged within those nations.”17  She also notes that, despite there being four 
types of terrorism in existence today (left-wing, right-wing, ethno-nationalist/separatist, 
and religious or “sacred”), the trend since the 1990s has been a decrease in overall 
terrorist attacks, despite an increase in religiously motivated attacks, a growth in the 
lethality of attacks, and an increasing number of attacks targeting Americans.18  This last 
point is not surprising, as globalization, with its characteristics of Westernization, 
secularization, democratization, consumerism, and the growth of market capitalism, has a 
very American feel to it.  Thus, anti-globalization sentiments often present themselves as 
anti-American in nature, with the backlash to American economic, political and social 
power coming from conservative cultures and less privileged populations.19 
 For Sedgwick, ideology has a major impact on the adoption of terrorist strategies 
by a group.  He argues that terrorism originates in the global environment; when groups 
witness the success of terrorist tactics they may opt to employ their own violent strategies 
                                                           
15 Ibid, 32. 
16 David C. Rapoport,  “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James Ludes, 
eds, AttackingTerrorism:  Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press 
2004), 47. 
17 Cronin, 35. 
18 Ibid, 42. 




to achieve their goals.20  He argues a “contagion” hypothesis, claiming that previously 
used strategies and tactics, especially those applied at the global level, inspire other 
organizations to act in the same manner, and utilize either the same or similar 
techniques.21  Thus, while ideology plays an important role for why groups form, it is the 
indirect impact of global events, specifically the success of an attack, which provides the 
inspiration for organizations to adopt terrorist strategies.22 
 Finally, like Crenshaw and Cronin, Newman lists a number of factors which 
contribute to the formation of terrorist groups and subsequent execution of attacks.  He 
cites grievances such as poverty, social inequality or exclusion, dispossession, human 
rights abuse, alienation and humiliation, as well as a number of precipitant conditions 
associated with urbanization, a clash of values and various demographic factors as giving 
rise to terrorism.23  These features are quite similar to those presented by Crenshaw and 
Cronin, illustrating that any combination of anti-modernism, anti-globalization, feelings 
of resentment and desperation, weak government, unemployment, inequality affecting 
distinct groups and injustice, as well as numerous other factors, has an opportunity to 
facilitate terrorist group formation.  However, Newman does mention that the root causes 
are not applicable in every case, and that there is no direct cause and effect relationship 
between the stated root causes and the creation of terrorist organizations.24  Thus, while 
Newman’s list of root causes is helpful in understanding what can contribute to the rise of 
terrorism, it, like Sedgwick’s contagion hypothesis, is not the only explanation.   
                                                           
20 Mark Sedgwick, “Inspiration and the Origins of the Global Waves of Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 30, no. 2 (2007):  98. 
21 Ibid, 101. 
22 Ibid, 109. 
23 Newman, Edward.  “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism.”  Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, 
no. 8 (2006):  751-753. 




 Piracy, like terrorism, can result from a number of various factors.  Admiral Thad 
Allen, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, pointed out the two most prevalent 
in an April 2009 news release, claiming that the root causes of piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
and Western Indian Ocean are political instability and a lack of economic opportunity in 
Somalia.  Like Admiral Allen, McNeill and Schaefer also point to the failure of a 
centralized state authority as facilitating maritime piracy in the region; they claim it 
allows pirates to collect resources for future missions, run intelligence collecting 
operations needed to target ships in the area, and provides a market for captured cargo, 
thus making further profit.25  Yet, poverty and the rampant lack of economic opportunity 
contribute to the real motivator for piracy:  easy money.  The capture of a ship, its cargo, 
and hostages usually translates into a one to two million dollar ransom paid by the 
shipping company, making piracy a highly lucrative business for those otherwise facing 
desolation.26 
 Max Boot elaborates on this point, stating that the piracy industry is one of the 
biggest employers in Somalia, as it offers immense opportunities for economic 
advancement in a country that has an average GDP per capita of $600 USD.27  Like 
terrorism, piracy exists where the opportunity exists.  With a majority of the major naval 
powers’ resources dedicated to conventional operations and counter-terrorism missions, 
piracy had been widely overlooked in the Horn of Africa until 2008.  In addition, as the 
odds of attack on a vessel transiting the region are slim, shipping companies would rather 
                                                           
25 Jena Baker McNeill and Brett D. Schaefer,  “Options for Combating Piracy in Somalia.” Heritage 
Foundation WebMemo 'o. 2397 (15 April 2009), 1.  
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/wm2397.cfm 
26 Ibid. 
27 Max Boot,  “Pirates Then and Now:  How Piracy Was Defeated in the Past and Can be Again.”  Foreign 




pay ransoms averaging one million dollars per ship than implement extra security 
measures.28  As a result, piracy is flourishing in the Horn of Africa. 
 According Pham, piracy is located, as Boot pointed out, where the opportunity 
lies.  Due to the lack of centralized state authority and the rampant lawlessness 
throughout Somalia, pirates have been able to entrench themselves in the country.  Pham 
explains that the political economy of piracy involves individuals from all levels within 
Somali society, allowing the pirates to build large, organized networks that conduct 
sophisticated operations.29  The 2005 United States National Strategy for Maritime 
Security presents the same notion – that piracy exists in areas of high commercial 
activity, especially where there is vast political and economic instability, and flourishes in 
regions where there is little or no maritime law enforcement capability.30   
In his writings, Murphy illustrates similarities between facilitation of both pirate 
organizations and terrorist groups.  He categorizes piracy as organized crime, but notes 
that a permissive political environment allows both terrorism and organized crime to 
flourish on land.31  Murphy also cites cultural acceptability and, specifically in regard to 
piracy, the opportunity for reward as contributing factors.  Like Murphy, Menkhaus 
relates Somali piracy to the political and economic issues on shore.  Piracy itself is just a 
symptom and outward projection of the lack of a stable, strong government and effective 
law enforcement organizations.  Further, it is a viable, low-risk, high-yield alternative to 
                                                           
28 Ibid. 
29 J. Peter Pham,  “The Pirate Economy.”  Foreign Policy (April 2009:  Web Exclusive),  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4817   
30 The United States National Strategy for Maritime Security.  September 2005, 5.   
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD13_MaritimeSecurityStrategy.pdf   
31 Martin N. Murphy,  “Suppression of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism:  a Suitable Role for A Navy?” 




otherwise bleak economic opportunities.32  The United States National Security Council 
emphasizes this financial aspect of piracy in its Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa:  
Partnership & Action Plan, stating that the end goal is substantial ransom payments, as 
these are the lifeblood of Somali pirates.33   
 Reveron agrees that easy access has allowed piracy to flourish in the Horn of 
Africa.  He acknowledges that there are very few barriers to entry into the industry, citing 
the problem as poor governance on shore.34  Like the NSC Plan, he mentions the large 
pool of possible recruits who hope to achieve economic prosperity, and also notes that the 
Somali pirates do not see themselves as criminals.  Rather, Reveron explains that the 
pirates view their activities as in defense of the local fishing industry, with some even 
regarding themselves as a type of coast guard.35  Lennox elaborates on this point, 
claiming that piracy began as a reaction to illegal fishing in Somali waters, and was 
initially defensive in nature.36  Once the mechanisms and opportunities for expansion 
were in place, however, piracy was able to grow around the Horn of Africa.  Lennox 
explains that the possibility of an impoverished future, desperation, greed, entrenched 
pirate networks extending into the upper levels of government, sanctuary and opportunity 
all contribute to contemporary piracy off the Horn of Africa.37 
                                                           
32 Ken Menkhaus,  “Dangerous Waters.” Survival 51, no. 1 (2009), 22. 
33 The United States National Security Council. “Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & 
Action Plan.”  2008., 6. 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Countering_Piracy_Off_The_Horn_of_Africa_-
_Partnership__Action_Plan.pdf   
34 Derek S. Reveron,  “Think Again:  Pirates.”  Foreign Policy (January 2009:  Web Exclusive), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4626   
35 Ibid. 
36 Patrick Lennox,  “Contemporary Piracy off the Horn of Africa.”  Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs 
Institute (December 2008), 8. 
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Contemporary%20Piracy%20off%20the%20Horn%20of%20Africa.pdf   
37 Ibid, 2-4. 
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 Finally, in a Congressional Research Service report, Ploch and others, cite 
instability and economic hardship as the causes of maritime piracy, and also point to 
specific factors of both areas which contribute to the overall problem.  The full list 
includes poverty, lack of employment, environmental hardship, pitifully low incomes, 
reduction of pastoralist and maritime resources due to drought and illegal fishing, and a 
volatile security and political situation.38  These factors illustrate that solving the problem 
is going to be extremely difficult, and will require a number of approaches.  
 In summary, terrorism is mainly the result of concrete grievances by distinct, 
often elite, populations.  Modern terrorism is a backlash to globalization, modernity and 
Westernization.  It can be motivated by the proven success of other groups, or by 
perceived injustice or inequality.  Counter-terrorism initiatives in the twenty-first century 
have relied heavily on military intervention.  However, this has proven to be successful 
only at the outset.  As Cronin explains, the United States and its allies should use military 
force in the short term, combining airstrikes with specific ground missions carried out by 
specialized forces, and incorporate all types of intelligence collection and analysis, 
focusing on human intelligence and cultural sensitivity, into these missions.39  She does 
go on to say that this will not fix the problem in the long run.  Cronin states that longer-
term plans need to be implemented to restructure the global environment, and that in 
order to counter the root causes of terrorism, the United States need to work with partner 
                                                           
38 Lauren Ploch and others.  “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.”  Congressional Research Service (21 April 
2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf , 6. 




countries to implement economic growth, sustainable development, and encourage 
advances in democracy and human rights.40   
 The factors influencing piracy differ from those motivating terrorism.  Maritime 
piracy is the result of poverty, economic desperation, a lack of effective law enforcement 
capabilities, political instability, and a decrease of maritime and pastoralist resources as a 
result of drought and illegal fishing.  Military action alone cannot eradicate piracy off the 
Horn of Africa.  As the literature shows, it is only partially effective.  Pham argues, 
however, that naval ships have the ability to interdict attacks or suspected pirates, and 
detain those suspected of participating in acts of piracy.41  Similar to terrorism, the only 
real way to halt piracy is to implement a strong central government capable of dealing 
with the threat.42  In addition, an increase in legal, profitable economic opportunities will 
provide alternatives to engaging in acts of piracy. 
 Before implementing a military response to terrorism and piracy, other solutions 
need to be discussed and attempted.  The most important of these is diplomacy.  
Unfortunately, diplomacy in these situations is difficult to pursue.  As Somalia’s 
Transitional Federal Government has no real power, working with government officials 
will, in the end, prove to be futile, with the exception of determining what the 
government feels the international community should do to halt the spread of piracy.  
Solving terrorism through diplomacy is just as difficult, as the official stance of the 
United States is not to negotiate with terrorists.  Cronin’s notion of addressing grievances 
and inequalities in the long term comes close, especially as it will take cooperation with 
                                                           
40 Ibid. 
41 Pham 2009. 
42Ken  Menkhaus, “The Seven Ways to Stop Piracy.”  Foreign Policy (April 2009:  Web Exclusive),  




international partners and the governing bodies of the countries in which these measures 
are pursued.  However, it is more in line with counterinsurgency doctrine than 
negotiating the end to a conflict.  Thus, diplomatic efforts tend to be ineffective in these 
situations. 
 
Maritime Security Policy 
 The goal of the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security claims the United 
States must “detect, deter, interdict, and defeat terrorist attacks, criminal acts, or hostile 
acts in the maritime domain, and prevent its unlawful exploitation for those purposes.”43  
It states the U.S. will conduct monitoring and patrolling operations to protect its maritime 
borders, exclusive economic zones and high seas areas of interest, and institute reliable 
deterrent and interdiction capabilities, as well as effective prevention measures, in the 
forms of operations and security programs, to increase threat knowledge and awareness.44  
The Strategy directs the United States to work with international partners to achieve its 
objectives of preventing terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts, protecting maritime-
related population centers and critical infrastructures, minimizing damage and expediting 
recovery, and safeguarding the ocean and its resources.45 
 Focusing specifically on terrorism the 2006 National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism outlines a plan that involves fighting terrorism by promoting democracy as a 
long-term solution to the problem, preventing attacks of terrorist networks, denying 
terrorist groups and rogue states access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and 
                                                           
43 The United States National Strategy for Maritime Security, 8. 
44 Ibid, 8-9. 




denying terrorists the sanctuary of rogue states or control of any nation from which they 
could operate.46 
 The policies concerning piracy send a very similar message, and have much of the 
same tone as those regarding terrorism.  In April 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
specified the U.S. policy on maritime piracy, stating:  “The United States does not make 
concessions or ransom payments to pirates.”  Previously, the National Security Council 
released a plan in 2008 specifically outlining the steps necessary for combating piracy off 
the Horn of Africa.  In the  Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & 
Action Plan, the causes for concern, objectives of the United States concerning Somali 
piracy, and strategies for combating piracy are clearly detailed.  The U.S. is tasked with 
preventing, disrupting, and punishing acts of Somali pirate organizations by reducing the 
vulnerability of the maritime domain, operating in accordance with international law and 
the rights of flag and coastal states to interrupt acts of piracy, and hold accountable, 
through fair prosecution, individuals suspected of piracy.47  To achieve these goals, the 
United States is directed to develop a global partnership plan, engage in a Contact Group 
on Somali Piracy, contribute to a regional Counter-Piracy Coordination Center (CPCC), 
encourage the use of a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden, urge 
commercial ships to update their security practices, strengthen strategic communications, 
maintain a persistent interdiction-capable presence, seize and destroy equipment and 
vessels used for piracy, disrupt revenue, dismantle bases on shore, develop agreements in 
accordance with international conventions and international law on custody and 
                                                           
46 The United States Strategy for Combating Terrorism.  September 2006. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/national/nsct_sep2006.pdf 




prosecution of suspected pirates, support ship-rider programs to facilitate the arrest and 
detainment of suspected pirates, and improve the capabilities of regional States to 
prosecute, extradite, or incarcerate suspected pirates.48  
 Attached to the NSC Plan is the 2007 Policy for the Repression of Piracy and 
other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, which claims that freedom on the high seas 
requires international cooperation, and coordination between all departments and 
agencies within the U.S. Government.  It states that piracy repression should include 
diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic, law enforcement, and judicial actions, and 
emphasizes the necessity to prevent pirate and other criminal acts at sea, disrupt and 
terminate pirate attacks within the bounds of international law and the rights and 
responsibilities of coastal and flag states, and bring to justice those accountable for acts 
of piracy.49  The Policy also notes that responses to piracy will vary depending on the 
political, geographic and legal environments, as well as the mission and the nature of the 
threat. 
Finally, in a Congressional Research Service Report regarding piracy around the 
Horn of Africa, Ploch and others, outline what needs to be done in the long-term to 
combat Somali piracy.  Statements released by the Obama administration point to a 
continuation of the counter-piracy policies initiated by the George W. Bush 
administration.  These policies advocate achieving political stability and establishing 
governance in Somalia, implementing rule of law, providing security to Somali citizens, 
and increasing economic development in the country.50 
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The policies of the United States Government concerning maritime security 
threats, and specifically maritime piracy, have been evaluated by numerous authors who 
have either supported, expanded, deconstructed, or revised the current courses of action.  
Pham argues that political institutions, especially at the local level, and security 
capabilities, specifically an official coast guard, must be built, strengthened and sustained 
by Somalis in order to reduce the rampant lawlessness that is allowing piracy to continue.  
Additionally, he advocates the use of the military, as it will be needed both as a deterrent 
and as a resource in high-risk situations.51   
Like Pham, Menkhaus argues the usefulness of military action, claiming that 
while naval vessels cannot halt piracy, they can interdict and apprehend those suspected 
of undertaking acts of piracy.52  Menkhaus also outlines seven options for dealing with 
piracy, exploring the reasoning behind the seven main options for combating the threat.  
First, he suggests that the world can live with piracy as a nuisance, as European powers 
did in the Barbary corsair era, since ransom amounts, which are not huge costs for 
shipping companies, do not justify military response.53  Second, he examines the use of 
military patrols, pointing out that, to date, they have not worked as planned.  Further, he 
states it is widely agreed upon that naval interdiction alone cannot stop piracy off the 
Horn of Africa, and may be ineffective at reducing pirate attacks in the region.54  He also 
addresses the notion of arming cargo ships, explaining that this option is not viable.  
Legal concerns, combined with increasing insurance costs and a possible escalation of 
violence, are resulting in major resistance to this option from shipping companies, who 
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prefer to pay ransom costs.55  The notion of military action on land has also been put 
forth, an idea that Menkhaus disagrees with, citing certain civilian casualties, likely 
unsuccessful airstrikes, and risk to the welfare of hostages and U.S. strategic interests in 
Somalia as reasons to avoid this strategy.56  Additionally, he comments on the financial 
aspects of the problem.  Menkhaus states that going after the financiers of piracy, a 
strategy for combating both piracy and terrorism, will be incredibly difficult, and could 
also hurt the coastal economy that has greatly benefitted from piracy.  As for ransom 
payments, he states that if the act is no longer profitable, then it will cease.  However, a 
refusal to pay ransoms would have to be paired with increased military action to be 
effective, which, as Menkhaus pointed out, has not yet achieved the desired results.57  
Finally, Menkhaus addresses the policy most widely agreed on, which Ploch highlights in 
the CRS report.  He claims that backing a government that can enforce rule of law in 
Somalia, where law enforcement capabilities can deal with piracy on-shore, is the most 
viable option to ending piracy off the Horn of Africa.58 
Unlike Menkhaus, Middleton favors the international community conduct a 
military campaign to combat Somali piracy.  Like Menkhaus, he mentions that the only 
real solution is political stability inside Somalia, and thus the international community 
has the option of doing nothing.  However, as piracy is linked to Somalia’s internal 
problems, doing nothing allows piracy to continue to flourish in the region.59  Thus 
Middleton presents three military-based solutions.  First, as is advocated in the NSC’s 
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Partnership & Action Plan, a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) could be organized 
for commercial ships to sail through under the protection of military vessels.60  However, 
while he does point to this as being a viable option, he also mentions that a MSPA would 
only decrease the danger for ships traveling on an East-West route, while those traveling 
North-South would still be prone to attack.  Secondly, Middleton mentions that “an 
internationally sanctioned and administered coast guard” would be an effective option for 
combating piracy off Somalia.61  Finally, Middleton mentions the use of a large naval 
force, similar to the military presence proposed in the NSC’s Plan.  He explains that 
while it would be expensive, an international force has the ability to reduce incidences of 
piracy through deterrence and interdiction.62  However, Middleton supports the use of a 
substantial naval combined fleet to patrol a MSPA. 
McNeill and Schaefer advocate international action, stating that the role of the 
United States Navy is to participate in intelligence sharing, targeted operations, and 
search and rescue operations with other concerned naval powers.63  Also, they mention 
that in order to make the seas safer, the Navy should conduct hostage rescue operations, 
and, as supported by the NSC’s Plan, deter piracy off the Horn of Africa by participating 
in interdiction and blockade missions.64  Included in these missions should be 
international naval efforts to conduct blockade and interdiction operations around ports in 
Somalia and elsewhere known to be harboring pirates.65 
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In concern to naval operations, Lennox addresses the elements necessary for 
conducting military missions.  He explains that a critical mass of warships, as well as 
their assets, are required if sea-based tactics are to be constantly pursued.  Further, he 
emphasizes that while an international effort is important, regional navies need to make a 
more concerted effort to halt the problem.66  Also, as is advocated by the NSC’s Plan, 
Lennox states that commercial vessels must implement operational and communications 
security (OPSEC) practices to protect themselves from potential attacks.  Finally, he 
notes that private security firms seem to be the most effective “band-aid solution” to 
protecting commercial ships from pirate attacks.67 
Kraska and Wilson, like Lennox, suggest that measures other than military 
operations are more effective in solving the problem of Somali piracy.  They explicitly 
state that despite the increase in the number and types of warships patrolling the waters 
around the Horn of Africa, the patrols have been largely unsuccessful in stemming the 
tide of Somali piracy.68  Rather than relying solely on military action, they advocate the 
use of international cooperation between governments, international organizations, and 
the private sector in order to combine financial, political, military and legal resources to 
contain piracy.69  Kraska and Wilson heavily emphasize the importance of international 
coordination in counter-piracy strategies.  They do acknowledge that until political 
stabilization is achieved in Somalia, the problem of piracy will have to be addressed from 
sea to shore.  Also, Kraska and Wilson emphasize that international cooperation must 
occur between major maritime powers, shipping states, and regional partners in order to 
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implement deterrents such as prosecution and punishment; they claim that pursuing this 
line of action, in accordance with international law, is more likely to halt the continuance 
of maritime piracy than the just presence of warships.70  Additionally, they suggest that 
regional states need to take the lead in protecting their own waters, and that the 
international community should participate in an international Maritime Operational 
Threat Response Plan (MOTR)71 in order to aid and support counter-piracy operations.  
They explain that an international MOTR plan would allow round-the-clock maintaining 
of communications among the various maritime states patrolling the area, and permits 
countries to quickly coordinate responses and issues pertaining to on-scene interdiction of 
ships hijacked by suspected pirates.72 
Likewise, Patch does not agree with United States government policies regarding 
maritime piracy.  He believes that piracy is a law enforcement problem, and thus the 
military is not useful in combating piracy.  Rather, he advocates the use of the military in 
instances of terrorism.73  If military action is going to be used, however, Patch argues that 
it should be in support of law enforcement agencies.  For the United States, this means 
either the Coast Guard, or placing law-enforcement capabilities (LEDETS) on board 
ships.  Patch claims that law enforcement bureaus are better able to handle piracy because 
modern warships, outfitted to confront traditional threats, are poorly equipped to handle 
                                                           
70 James Kraska and Brian Wilson,  “Fighting Pirates:  The Pen and the Sword.” World Policy Journal 25, 
no. 4 (Winter 2008/09):  47-52. 
71
 The MOTR plan supports the National Strategy for Maritime Security, and “aims for coordinated United 
States Government response to threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain by 
establishing roles and responsibilities that enable the government to respond quickly and decisively.” 
72 James Kraska and Brian Wilson,  “Fighting Piracy:  International Coordination is Key to Countering  
Modern-day Freebooters.”  Armed Forces Journal (February 2009) 
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/02/3928962  




piracy.74  Finally, he suggests the private sector implement anti-piracy best practices to 
protect their vessels at sea. 
Another option is for the United States is to solely pursue its maritime self-
interests.  Murphy discusses this notion, questioning whether or not the U.S. Navy should 
be used to combat asymmetric threats, and suggesting that the U.S. must protect its self-
interest.  For Murphy, this means that modern navies should use their power in defense of 
trade.75  He suggests that the U.S. Navy redevelop its old virtue of presence and exercise 
its informational, humanitarian, and diplomatic capabilities as part of its power in actions 
abroad. 
According to Boot, the United States Government can pursue more than 
diplomatic and military solutions.  While he does suggest that the U.S. and its allies 
increase the number of warships in the region, he also mentions the ability of the U.S. to 
revive letters of marquee,76 although permitting modern day privateers to operate would 
likely cause considerably more problems.77  Boot examines the private sector’s role in 
dealing with piracy.  He proposes the argument made by retired Army Officer Ralph 
Peters, stating that the U.S. Government could adopt a plan that would deny any 
company the right to do business in the U.S. if it fulfills ransom demands.78  Boot also 
presents the argument of Claude Berube of the U.S. Naval Academy, claiming national 
forces be augmented by private security firms, at the cost to the shipping companies.79  
The use of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and prosecution of suspected pirates are what 
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Boot argues are the best options to deter Somali piracy until rule of law is established on 
land.80 
Finally, Reveron argues for an increase in protective measures on ships.  He 
believes that on-board deterrents are a commercial vessel’s best option for defense, but 
emphasizes these best-practice security procedures, and not armed security guards, are 
what is needed.81  As for a military role, he states that there may be a role for naval 
escorts to protect humanitarian aid ships, but there are too many commercial vessels for 
military patrols to be otherwise effective.82 
 
Ransom Payments 
 There are mixed feelings world-wide about ransom payments to pirates.  On the 
one hand, they guarantee the safe release of a ship, its crew and its cargo, with relatively 
little overall cost to the shipping company.  On the other hand, paying ransoms 
exacerbates and elongates the problem, allowing piracy to flourish.  Menkhaus argues 
that ransom money is dangerous, not only because it risks attacks on commercial vessels, 
but also because it allows piracy to become entrenched in Somali society.  He claims that 
the revenue from ransoms is “leading to the rise of a mafioso racket in which top political 
and business figures are earning sizable cuts of the ransoms.”83  Also, pirate acts, 
exacerbated by ransom payments, are a threat to regional commerce and the flow of 
humanitarian aid into Somalia, and the revenues may potentially find their way into the 
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hands of the radical al-Shabaab movement.84  Finally, Menkhaus notes that if ransom 
refusal is to be put into effect, it would have to be in conjunction with increased military 
rescue operations in order to avoid failure.85 
 Middleton argues that the reasoning behind ceasing ransom payment – if ransom 
payments stop, then the incentives to engage in piracy decrease due to it no longer being 
prosperous – fails to acknowledge two notions.  First, if ransom payments end, pirates 
may just alter their tactics, and, as happened in Indonesia, create “phantom ships” from 
captured vessels.86  Thus, pirates would still earn revenue from their endeavors.  
Secondly, Middleton points out that ransoms will likely continue because no company 
wants to risk the lives of the hostages, let alone be the first to refuse payments when the 
price of doing so is so high.87  As a result, Middleton proposes companies make an effort 
to deflate the ransoms paid, as it could have a positive impact. 
Boot argues that ransom payments, combined with a lack of challenge to piracy at 
sea, are allowing the problem to spiral out of control.  He points to the United States’ 
experience with the Barbary States during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
illustrating how ransom payments never satisfied the leaders of the Barbary States, and 
the problem continued until the U.S. conducted substantial naval operations against 
Tripoli and Algiers.88  Pham agrees that hefty ransom revenues are cause for the 
continuation of piracy, citing that ship owners and insurers are partially responsible for 
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the growth in the industry, as their ransom payments have given increasing numbers of 
Somalis incentive to pursue a career in piracy.89 
 
Military Intervention 
Military action in response to acts of terrorism and instances of piracy has had 
varied results.  Hoffman points out that in the initial incursion into Afghanistan following 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, the military’s “shock and awe” strategy was a success.  
However, al-Qaeda operatives have adapted their methods to combat allied forces’ 
military operations in the region with lethal results.  He suggests that the U.S. military 
must modify its own counter-terrorism strategy to meet the new tactical changes of its 
adversaries, as the “kill or capture” approach is no longer working.90 
  Likewise, in his discussion of the relationship between terrorism and military 
action, Lesser states that the United States military is increasingly facing asymmetric 
threats.  He claims that modern terrorism may be a consequence of current and past 
Western military action throughout the rest of the world.91  The military incursion in 
Saudi Arabia, starting with the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War and lasting throughout the 
remainder of the 1990s, is a good example of this notion, as the Western military 
presence in the Muslim holy land was listed as a major grievance of al-Qaeda.  Lesser 
examines the case of Libya during the 1980s, stating that despite airstrikes as part of 
Operation El Dorado Canyon, launched in response to the bombing of a Berlin club 
frequented by U.S. military personnel, the decrease in terrorist activity in the mid-1980s 
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was short lived; terrorist incidents flared up again in 1987 and 1988, including the 
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.92 
Tucker, in his comparison of United States and Israeli counter-terrorism efforts, 
claims that military intervention is only one tool to use when combating terrorism.93  He 
notes that both Israel and the U.S. have focused too narrowly on a military solution, 
ignoring the root causes of terrorism and focusing mainly on physical security as the 
means for countering terrorist attacks.  For Tucker, a successful counter-terrorism 
strategy needs to focus on more than just the military aspect; to be truly effective a 
counter-terrorism strategy that addresses the socio-economic and political grievances 
must be developed, and used in conjunction with military action.94   
 The use of military force to combat piracy, like terrorism, has had mixed results.  
It has seen success in the rescue of Maersk Alabama Captain Richard Phillips by the U.S. 
Navy, but has been unable to fully deter attacks.  Kraska and Wilson explain that the 
military operations off the Horn of Africa have been largely unsuccessful thus far due to 
the manner in which they are conducted.  They claim that the only sea-based solutions 
will involve the major maritime powers support of regional players. Included in this 
relationship is increased capacity building through a Global Train and Equip program,95 
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and the development of a maritime organization in east Africa that can help build a coast 
guard for the region.96   
 Menkhaus concludes that naval operations help, but cannot halt the spread of 
piracy in the long-run.  Military action is not the end-all solution in this situation because 
naval vessels can only interdict and apprehend pirates at sea.  However, military 
operations do not fix the problem on land.97  Yet, as Axe claims, counter-piracy 
operations have had some limited successes.  He points to the cooperation between the 
French and American Navies that resulted in the rescue of the luxury yacht Le Ponant’s 
thirty crew and capture of six suspected pirates in April 2008.98  Additionally, Axe 
explains that the United States Navy is actively seeking out pirates at sea and on shore 
through the use of ScanEagle drones and is also using helicopters and other equipment to 
conduct deterrence and rescue missions.99 
 
Summary 
 A number of the arguments made by the authors are important in determining the 
most viable counter-piracy strategy.  First, a different approach from counter-terrorism 
operations is needed.  The different factors contributing to terrorism and piracy call for 
different solutions to each threat.  Where terrorism is the result of socio-economic and 
political grievances, especially concerning clashes of values, a disparity between the 
‘haves and have-nots’, perceptions of injustice, inequality, dispossession, humiliation and 
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alienation, piracy is the result of economic desperation.  It is caused by poverty, 
widespread unemployment, environmental hardship, and, in the Somali case, illegal 
fishing, and is facilitated by political instability, the lack of a centralized state authority, 
the absence of adequate law enforcement institutions, and cultural acceptability.  Piracy is 
traditionally an opportunistic crime, whereas terrorist attacks are carefully and 
methodically planned.   
The factors which contribute most to terrorist group formation show that it is a 
reaction to certain outside influences, most notably globalization, modernity, 
Westernization and capitalism, as well as to perceptions of inequality.  Piracy, on the 
other hand, has purely economic roots.  Unlike terrorism, there is no political or social 
inequality aspect to piracy.  There is no clash of values between pirates and their targets, 
and Somali pirates do not target ships based on their flag, indicating a lack of the 
backlash to Westernization and globalization that is characteristic of terrorism.  However, 
there are a few similarities between terrorism and piracy.  For one, both have economic 
components.  Piracy is a business because individuals facing otherwise bleak financial 
futures have the opportunity to make easy money.  In regards to terrorism, the lower 
ranks of terrorist groups consist of poor, disillusioned individuals who encountered a lack 
of employment opportunities in urban, capitalist settings.  Also, social facilitation and 
political permissiveness both allow terrorist and pirate organizations to thrive, as there is 
no challenge to the rise of such groups. 
 The nature of the threat and the role of politics are also important to consider in 
determining the best course of action.  Piracy, at its most basic, is a crime.  Somali piracy 
has flourished in the early part of the twenty-first century, growing into several large, 
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sophisticated organized crime syndicates.  It has become entrenched in society – from the 
lowest class to the upper echelons, and it is believed that warlords and government 
officials alike are reaping the financial benefits of piracy.  However, despite government 
officials receiving a share of the profits, there is no political characteristic to piracy.  
Pirate organizations do not desire political power and a radical change of the government, 
but rather are simply in the business for the money. 
 Finally, it is important to note that certain aspects of the various solutions thus far 
presented have been successful.  Considering the goal of safe return of crew, cargo and 
vessel, private shipping companies have had complete success by paying ransoms.  
However, giving in to ransom demands does nothing to halt the spread of piracy.  In 
terms of best safety practices and on-board deterrents, it is agreed that these are the first 
line of defense against pirate attacks.  They have had some success deterring attacks, and 
academics and government officials alike advocate shipping companies have their vessels 
utilize evasive maneuvers, install protections such as high-powered fire hoses and 
Magnetic Acoustic Devices, and practice operational and communications security.   
The best solution to Somali piracy is solving the situation on land.  Economic and 
political stability, with effective law enforcement institutions, are needed to end piracy 
off the Horn of Africa.  In terms of diplomatic efforts to halt piracy, diplomacy with 
Somali officials is only effective with a strong central government.  The success of 
current diplomatic pursuits has been in garnering international support of counter-piracy 
mandates, initiatives, and operations.  Finally, military patrols have had some success in 
thwarting pirate attacks in the region.  Where military operations have been extremely 
successful is in conducting interdiction, detention, and rescue operations, most notably 
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with the rescue of the crew of the French yacht Le Ponant in 2008 and the rescue of 
























Chapter 2:  The Barbary Corsairs 
The Conflict 
The conflict between the Barbary regencies and the early American republic is 
rooted in a struggle that dates back to the First Crusade in the late eleventh century.  At 
the time, both Christians and Muslims supported raids against the other’s shipping, 
justifying it as an essential part of the religious battle.100  Eventually this progressed into 
a contest between the European powers, in particular Spain, and the Ottoman Turks over 
control of the Mediterranean Sea, which resulted in the separation of the Mediterranean 
Sea into two spheres of influence – the western half under the Spanish and the eastern 
portion under the Ottomans.101  As the Barbary privateers became increasingly active 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Europeans became tired of raids 
against their commercial vessels, and the Dutch and British reacted by quelling the 
Barbary fleets through excessive military force.102  By the late eighteenth century, when 
American shipping first encountered the Barbary privateers, the regencies were only able 
to support at most a dozen corsairs.103  However, for the United States, with its 
nonexistent navy and inability to negotiate realistic treaties, the Barbary corsairs were a 
major threat to trade and commercial shipping in the Mediterranean. 
Central to the conflict between the United States and the Barbary regencies was 
the religious struggle between Christianity and Islam, though more subdued than it had 
been in earlier centuries.  In May of 1786, then United States ambassadors to Britain and 
France, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, respectively, met with the Tripolitan 
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ambassador to Britain, Sidi Haji Abdul Rahman Adja, in an attempt to understand the 
hostility Tripoli had towards the U.S., and attempt to negotiate a peace treaty with the 
regency.  As was reported to the Continental Congress, the ambassador remarked “that it 
was founded on the Laws of their Prophet, that it was written in their Koran, that all 
nations who should not have acknowledged their authority were sinners, that it was their 
right and duty to make war upon them wherever they could be found, and to make slaves 
of all they could take as Prisoners, and that every Musselman who should be slain in 
Battle was sure to go to paradise.”104  Thus, the deys and beys of the Barbary regencies 
ordered the corsairs to raid American merchant vessels, and upon their capture demanded 
hefty payments of money, ships, naval stores and goods to secure the release of 
imprisoned sailors and merchants sold into slavery.  For the United States, however, it 
was not as much of a religious war as a cultural conflict.  After so recently achieving their 
independence, American citizens viewed the Barbary leaders as tyrannical, lawless, and 
uncivilized.  In essence, the Barbary leaders were foes that epitomized traits that were the 
exact opposite from the values and liberties the new republic saw itself as representing.  
Attacks against American commercial vessels, which were no longer under the 
protection of the British Navy, caught national attention in 1784 upon capture of the 
Betsey; the capture of both the Dauphin and the Maria in 1785 meant the Barbary 
corsairs were now a major threat to American economic prosperity and political 
independence.105  Raids against American shipping increased throughout the 1790s, with 
eleven vessels (the President, the George, the Jay, the Minerva of Philadelphia, the Jane, 
the Thomas, the Polly, the Hope, the Olive Branch, the Dispatch, and the Minerva of 
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New York) captured in 1793 alone.106  Details of the fates of the crew members aboard 
the ships captured in 1785 and 1793 are listed as follows:  of those freed, one was sent 
with dispatches (James Leander Cathcart of the Maria in 1796), one left with a treaty 
(Captain Richard O’Brien of the Philadelphia in 1795), and one was ransomed by the 
British.  The other one-hundred prisoners were redeemed, or released after ransom 
payments were received, by either friends, general redemption by the government, or the 
Dutch between 1793 and 1796.  Twenty-nine, however, died while in captivity from the 
plague, consumption, smallpox, cholic, and one in a “madhouse.”107  
Finally, the conflict was not limited to one between the United States and Barbary 
regencies.  At home there was vast disagreement on how to deal with the deys and beys 
of Barbary and their corsair fleets.  After America gained its independence and began to 
encounter issues in the Mediterranean Sea, it became clear that U.S. commercial vessels 
were vulnerable to interception and capture by any power, weak or strong.  It also 
became obvious that, due to a lack of power and resources, the United States government 
had no remedy to the situation.108  As the state of affairs worsened throughout the 
remainder of the eighteenth century and into the early nineteenth century, two camps 
arose within the U.S. government concerning the best course of action for dealing with 
the government leaders in Barbary.  One side, led by John Adams, claimed that because 
the tradition of the European powers was to pay tribute to the Barbary States, the United 
States had to follow this policy for it had no other means for dealing with the Barbary 
governments.  Adams argued for diplomacy because, when compared to the cost of 
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building a navy and waging war against the Barbary corsairs and their leaders, a 
negotiated treaty with annual tribute payments was financially less expensive.   
Thomas Jefferson, however, advocated using military force because he believed 
building a navy would be cheaper than constantly paying tribute to the leaders of 
Barbary.  He also argued that military defeat of the corsairs and their governments was a 
far more durable long-term solution that in the short-term would punish the captors of 
American sailors and bolster the United States’ standing in Europe.  Also naval victory 
would establish the United States as a free state whose economy and maritime trade was 
not threatened by the actions of the Barbary regencies.109  While the debate over the best 
course of action persisted, American citizens became increasingly frustrated with the 
situation in the Mediterranean.  Despite raising private funds to secure the release of 
American captives, they desired decisive action to end the threat the Barbary corsairs 
posed to U.S. mariners.  However, with government disagreement over how to proceed 
against the regencies, no effective solution would be pursued until war was declared 
against Tripoli in 1801. 
 
Background  
 For the United States, the Barbary Wars presented some of the first challenges, 
both domestic and international, the young republic faced.  The European powers had 
tolerated piracy in the Mediterranean since the sixteenth century, from the time of the 
decline of the corsair boom of Elizabethan England,110 and dealt with it until the 
nineteenth century when the Americans defeated Algiers in 1816.  The system of tribute 
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that the Europeans followed was repugnant to the Americans who, after recently fighting 
a war to protect personal liberties, pursued their goals of free trade and freedom of the 
seas into the Atlantic and Mediterranean, despite no longer having the protection from 
Barbary attacks that they enjoyed under the British.   
 The reasons behind European toleration are ones the United States experienced in 
its initial involvement with the Barbary regencies as well, and ones which still dominate 
international relations in the contemporary era:  national interest, commerce, and politics.  
Jealousy and desire for power dominated European politics during this era, and the 
various European powers (England, France, Spain, Holland and the Scandinavian states) 
used the Barbary corsairs as “pawns in a complex political and commercial game in 
which little was left to chance.”111  The Barbary States accepted this role, as treaties with 
each power, if it wished to participate in Mediterranean trade, were negotiated based on a 
system of tribute and bribery that benefited the regencies.  These treaties sponsored, in 
part, the continuation of the corsair business as the Europeans, operating in their realm of 
Machiavellian diplomacy, used the corsairs to further their national foreign policies; the 
Europeans allied themselves with Barbary to wage war on one another through corsair 
raids.112 
 Despite the drastic decrease in corsair activities by the late eighteenth century,113 
in 1783 the United States nevertheless entered a world of Mediterranean trade still 
dominated by a “system of tribute and bribery to piratical Muslim overlords entrenched 
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in their fortified seas thousands of miles from America’s shores.”114  Although the 
Americans asked the major European powers, especially France, for help and protection 
from the Barbary corsairs, the Europeans did little to aid the United States, as they did not 
wish to see the development of yet another competitor to their maritime trade.115  Thus, 
the Americans found themselves essentially on their own in dealing with the Barbary 
regencies.  After the capture of the American ship Betsey by Moroccan corsairs in 1784, 
the United States realized it needed to shape a policy for dealing with the Barbary 
regencies if it wished to participate in maritime commerce in the Mediterranean.   
Dealing with the corsair threat and the Barbary states was an immense and 
difficult task for the United States.  As a young country it had little power and influence, 
and even less money.  Although the traditional European model of negotiation and tribute 
was initially tried by the United States, the consuls sent to Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia, and 
Tripoli found it increasingly difficult to negotiate and continuously meet the exorbitant 
demands of the regencies’ rulers.  This was due mainly to the partisan bickering of the 
American government, the inability of the United States to offer large sums of money and 
grand presents as tribute, and the impatience of the pashas, deys and beys of the 
regencies.  This was especially the case in Tripoli and Algiers, and was such a problem 
that it soon became clear that the only way to deal with the Barbary corsairs was by show 
of force.  Thus, the United States, due to its pride, desire for freedom of the seas, and 
unwillingness to pay bribes to freely participate in maritime commerce,116 found itself 
involved in some of the first military campaigns since the end of the War for 
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The western stretch of North Africa along the southern Mediterranean Sea was 
referred to as the Barbary Coast through the early nineteenth century.117  The area was 
ideal for pirates and privateers to operate out of due to the natural harbors backed by 
lagoons.  These areas often experienced strong, intense storms that proved fatal for those 
who did not know the coastline.118  It is to this day also known as the Maghreb, or “Land 
of Sunset”, in the Arab world, indicating its significance as Islam’s territory west of 
Egypt.119  Today it encompasses the countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, 
and was the location of the Barbary regencies of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. 
 Barbary itself was originally part of the Ottoman Empire, and thus subject to the 
rule of the sultan.  However, the sultan appointed rulers of each of the regencies, offices 
which, if not obtained through appointment, were acquired either through lineage or 
vicious fighting.120  Despite the overall rule of the sultan, the regencies retained power 
over their territories, and eventually resembled individual states rather than a portion of a 
powerful empire.  For example, Algiers had a system of Islamic courts and judges, 
mosques and Qur’anic schools, municipal facilities, a police force and market inspectors; 
and private property was respected, financial records kept, and merchants and artisans 
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were able to trade and sell their products and retain the proceeds.121  The regencies were 
also able to negotiate and observe international treaties (although they did so arbitrarily) 
without the approval of the Ottoman sultan. 
 Thus, the deys and beys, or leaders, of the regencies had control over their 
territories, and were able to legitimize and launch their own corsair campaigns against the 
European’s and American’s Mediterranean trade.  In addition to the Mediterranean Sea, 
corsairs were instructed to search for merchant vessels in the Atlantic, and pursued these 
instructions vigorously.  Coastal towns were often raided, and the Barbary corsairs 
operated as far north as England, Ireland, and Iceland, using the Irish city of Baltimore 
(whose population was later wiped out by the corsairs) as a base to launch attacks against 
vessels in the North Atlantic, especially English fishermen in the Bristol Channel.122 
 
Characteristics 
 Religion played a critical role in the history and actions of the Barbary corsairs.  
As Muslim states, the Barbary regencies were in constant conflict with the Christian 
European, and later American, states.  However, this religious conflict was more one of 
differences in culture and society than it was one of theology.  After the Spanish 
expulsion of the Moors in the early seventeenth century, the Barbary regencies justified 
increased attacks on Christian shipping as part of the al-jihad fi’l-bahr, or holy war at 
sea; they were also legitimized by the Muslim belief of having the right to capture and 
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enslave all non-Muslims.123  Often, the seamen of ships were either sold into slavery or 
retained by the government as slaves if they were of the ‘wrong’ religion.124 
 The peoples of the Barbary regencies were ethnically Berber.  They were a 
minority even to the Arab population, who viewed them as foreign and primitive, or 
barbari.  The Romans had originally classified them as such because they spoke neither 
Latin nor Greek.  Traditionally, they were pastoralists who viewed themselves as “noble 
and freeborn”, and though they were considered ferocious warriors, they remained a 
conquered people through much of their history, most significantly under the Arabs and 
Ottoman Turks.125 
 Piracy took root in the region after the activities of pirate Khayr an-Din 
Barbarossa in the sixteenth century.  It flourished during the Ottoman presence in the 
Maghreb, when the Ottoman sultan used Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers as strategic military 
locations from which to launch pirate attacks.  The pirates themselves were part of a 
ta’ifa, or community, of seamen, from which rose pirate captains called ru’asa, who were 
considered military heroes.  Eventually the ru’asa, who were extremely important to the 
economy and state revenues of the regencies, acquired the authority from the Ottoman’s 
to select a ruling officer, or dey (bey in Tunis), connecting piracy to the state, especially 
in Algiers.126 
 For the United States, the difficulty was in understanding how a society could be 
subservient to the dey, and submissive to both him and its religion.  Americans found 
three sharp distinctions between American Christianity and Barbary Islam:  individual 
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religious freedom, religion as an instrument of the state, and religious posturing in 
negotiations between the United and Barbary States.127  As a result, the view was that the 
United States was “locked in a struggle of liberty versus tyranny and good versus evil” 
with the Barbary regencies based on three notions:  piracy and trade, tyranny and 
freedom, and Islam and Christianity.128  This last concept was based on the American 
view that Muslim citizens in North Africa willingly allowed tyrants to thrive.  To a newly 
founded republic that based its ideals on notions such as the right to life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness, the submissiveness of the peoples of the Barbary regencies seemed 
barbaric and revolting.   
Nonetheless, the United States, before engaging in wars with Tripoli and Algiers, 
was forced to negotiate with, bribe, and pay tribute to the Muslim Barbary regencies for 
the right to participate in maritime commerce in the Mediterranean.  This was only 
heightened by the fact that once the American public became aware of the sufferings and 
fate of American seamen taken into captivity and enslaved by the Muslim Berbers, they 
demanded government action.  However, the only actions that could be taken (tribute as 
part of peace agreements) served to strengthen the power of the Barbary regencies, and 
contributed to their continued campaigns against Christian merchants. 
Though religion did have a key role in the conflict, American negotiators pressed 
that the religious differences between the United States and the Barbary regencies were a 
non-issue.129  Rather, as emphasized by enslaved Captain Richard O’Brien, later United 
States general consul to the Barbary Coast and consul to Algiers, money was the driving 
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Money was by far the most influential factor motivating a dey’s sanctioning of the 
corsair business.  Although merchants and artisans enjoyed trade and profited from 
domestic commerce, the citizens and economies of the regencies were dependant on 
foreign commerce and the demand created by revenues and goods brought in by the 
corsairs.131  Also, as the corsair fleets were drastically reduced by the mid-eighteenth 
century, the deys and beys were forced to break treaty obligations when desperate for 
money and living in fear of assassination.132  Interestingly, this notion that political 
stability is dependent on economic prosperity is a notion that both the Washington 
administration and government of Algiers shared in 1794,133 and one that will be returned 
to later in this study.   
The easiest way for the regencies to raise revenue was through their system of 
tribute and bribery.  Due to the continual wars between the Christian states, in particular 
the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and the United States’ War of 1812, the 
Barbary corsairs enjoyed relative freedom in the Mediterranean,134 and took full 
advantage of the fact that the navies of the major powers were not being sent to defend 
their merchant ships; these countries were too involved in their own wars to be bothered 
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with negotiations with the Barbary regencies.  Especially vulnerable as a result of this 
were American vessels, as United States merchantmen were easy targets due to the lack 
of clout the United States had in the region, as well as the absence of effective peace 
treaties with the Barbary powers. 
Tribute payments made to the regencies included presents for the Barbary leader, 
as well as his family and servants, and whatever natural resources, tools and weaponry 
the dey or bey desired.  For example, the Dey of Algiers’ exorbitant demands in 1794 
included gifts for the Dey’s wife and daughter, the chamberlain, cooks, clerks, money 
counters, ushers, officers of the justice, Turkish secretaries, Prime Minister, 
Generalissimo of the Turks, and Farmer General.135  Under the treaty of 1795, only 
approximately $642,500 of the original $2,247,000 demand was paid to the Dey, which 
had included a $354,000 ransom demand for one-hundred American captives.  A tribute 
of naval stores was also requested, including nails of various lengths, cables of various 
diameters, bomb shells of various calibers, rope, oars, gunpowder, pine and oak planks of 
various length and thickness, canvas, lead, and tar brushes to be brought to the Dey over 
a number of years. 
Religion, too, was a motivator for the corsairs.  Yet, it mainly consisted of Algiers 
obtaining its long-term political objective of ousting the Spanish from what it considered 
to be Muslim lands, and waging jihad on the Christian states.  However, operations 
eventually evolved into simple piracy on a large scale, organized by the state and in no 
way connected to Islam.136   
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 Finally, the actions of the Europeans indirectly helped fuel piracy in the 
Mediterranean.  Because the European powers viewed piracy as a nuisance that had to be 
dealt with in order to participate in maritime commerce in the Mediterranean, little was 
done to attempt to eradicate the threat.  Therefore, the Barbary regencies were able to 
follow a policy of extortion against the Europeans that was financially and politically 




 European and American merchant vessels were the targets of Barbary corsair 
attacks, and were considered important prizes if caught.  The United States and Europe 
transported goods such as wine, grain, fish, fruit, spices, rice, wheat, and coffee to and 
from the East Indies.137  While these cargoes would be taken during corsair raids, no 
commodity was as valuable to the corsairs and Barbary governments as Christian slaves.  
Because the Christian countries were willing to pay exorbitant amounts of money for the 
release of their citizens, as well as the fact that Muslims saw it as their right to be able to 
enslave non-Muslim prisoners, Barbary corsairs targeted American and European ships, 
as well as European coastal towns, for the specific purpose of enslaving their captives 
and levying a large ransom on their respective governments. 
Unfortunately, no merchant vessels, and in some cases naval ships (even when 
states had signed peace treaties with the regencies) were safe from attack; the deys would 
often arbitrarily disregard the treaties if they felt there had been any sort of breach, and 
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would thus view themselves now at war with the offending state.138  Again, American 
vessels were especially vulnerable, due to the fact that they were often unable to provide 
their stipulated payments on time.  For example, when Algiers declared war on the 
United States in 1785, the government did not send world of the announcement.  Rather, 
the United States found out through the French commandant at Toulon on July 14, 
1785.139  When a state was at war with another country, it was also incredibly vulnerable 
to attack, as the Barbary corsairs would seize the opportunity to capture more merchant 
vessels (as the naval vessels sometimes used as convoys were being directed elsewhere), 
and thus extract more tribute.  This was the American experience with Algiers (who were 
operating with British assistance) immediately preceding the War of 1812. 
 
'ature and Frequency of Attacks 
 The Barbary corsairs were apt to strike any vessel at any time, whether or not a 
peace treaty was in place.  Treaties could be broken without any notice and war declared 
against the adversary’s vessels, especially if the dey deemed that he had been wronged or 
that a state was not honoring its part of an agreement.  In the absence of peace 
agreements, the corsairs were instructed to strike any of the adversary’s merchant and 
naval vessels, particularly if it meant capturing state-of-the-art ships and their crew.  
 The nature of these attacks varied from utilizing a ship’s guns to mount an assault, 
to the more traditional and widely-used tactic of boarding a vessel and engaging in hand-
to-hand combat with its crew members.  Resistance to boarding was dependent on the 
type of vessel, its defense mechanisms, and the capabilities of its commander.  A 
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successful example of this is the engagement of the USS Enterprize with the Tripolitan 
pirate ship Tripoli on August 1, 1801.  During the battle the corsair captain sought to ram 
the Enterprize, attempted to board her three times, and tried to trick the Americans into 
believing he was surrendering.  Fortunately, under the leadership of Lieutenant Andrew 
Sterrett, the Enterprize was able to keep the corsairs from boarding, and after three hours 
of fighting destroy the Tripoli.140 
 Despite being considered legal by the international community (due to the fact 
that they were agents of a recognized government) and operating under the then current 
international laws on privateers and naval vessels, the corsairs nonetheless used deceitful 
tactics in pursuit of their victims.  They were known to fly false flags or feign friendship 
towards another ship in order to indicate it meant no harm to the other vessel.141  From 
there, the corsair vessel had the ability to easily attack, board and capture an enemy ship.  
Also, the Barbary regencies failed at times to notify their enemies they were at war, 
allowing them instead to believe their shipping was safe until the consul arrived in one of 
the regencies and was informed of the declaration of war.  
 While these attacks were violent in nature, the corsairs were required to maintain 
a measure of restraint during their assaults on another ship.  Because the ships and their 
crews were of such high value, the corsairs had to be careful not to do too much damage 
to the vessels, or kill or wound the crew members.  Any damage done would decrease the 
value of their victims, and would result in less revenue for both the government and the 
corsairs. 
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Treatment of Hostages 
 Christian slaves were of high value to the leaders of the Barbary regencies.  The 
captives were either sold or kept in the service of the government until their own 
government arranged the proper tribute for release. Firsthand accounts of the treatment 
endured by prisoners were often kept in personal journals, like that of James Leander 
Cathcart, future United States consul to Tunis and Tripoli, and specifically outline what 
life was like for the European and American captives in the Barbary regencies.  There 
was a sense of hierarchy in the Christian slave community; many captives were sent to a 
bagnio, or prison, and forced to work in hard labor camps while enslaved, while others 
were apprenticed to tradesmen, and some employed in the service of the dey or the 
regency’s admiralty.  Cathcart was lucky, throughout his years in Algiers he was assigned 
domestic chores (including the position of coffee server, or qahwaji, which was paid in 
gold coins by visitors), made clerk of the admiralty, and eventually made clerk of the 
Galera bagnio, where he was able to acquire and operate a tavern that served the 
prisoners and local residents.142  
 Most captives were not as lucky as Cathcart.  Upon capture many were forced to 
work in galleys manning the oars of captured ships now at the disposal of the corsairs, 
and those who were not were taken to the market, where they were beaten if they seemed 
weary or lazy, and then sold.  Often these individuals were sent to work in hard labor 
camps, including quarries, where the slaves would carry down stone they quarried from 
the mountains to the shore.  Some worked in fields or ran chores to and from the market, 
while others were shackled to carts and forced to sell water in the streets, and were beaten 
if they returned to their master with less than the sum he specified be obtained.  Women 
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were either forced into domestic servitude or sent to Constantinople to be concubines for 
the Ottoman sultan.143 
 
Actions Taken to Combat Piracy 
 Tribute and bribery were the established methods of conducting trade in the 
Mediterranean Sea and retrieving captives from the Barbary regencies.  The European 
powers had followed this system of appeasement for centuries, claiming that it was 
cheaper than using military force, and that having a naval presence in the region was only 
a tool for improving negotiations with the Barbary States.144  Initially, the United States 
followed the European model, advocating diplomacy and maintaining the position that 
paying off the deys was cheaper than building and maintaining a navy.  Under John 
Adams and Thomas Jefferson, the United States attempted negotiating treaties for 
protection with the European powers, as well as peace treaties with the Barbary regencies 
throughout the 1780s and 1790s.  By 1790 major issues had arisen due to the increased 
demands of the regencies, as well as the American view that paying tribute was 
dishonorable.  The unwillingness to continuously pay tribute, as well as the inability to do 
so, was the fatal flaw in the initial American approach to the conflict with the Barbary 
regencies.145 
 In an attempt to establish a solid, viable policy towards the Barbary problem, 
Thomas Jefferson offered the following options to Congress in 1790: 
• Ignore the threat and continue the status quo, by continuing to pay 
the high insurance premiums, risk the molestation of U.S. ships 
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and shipping, then pay the exorbitant ransoms and tariffs, leading 
inevitably to the abandonment of the Mediterranean market; 
 
• Obtain peace by purchasing it; or 
 
• Repel force by force and build a navy to fight the pirates.146 
 
While the United States attempted ransoming its captives on its own terms, the Barbary 
regencies demanded more than the Americans could afford.  In fact, in 1792, Jefferson 
instructed negotiators that refusing to pay Algiers the amount the dey requested was not 
as much out of concern for money, but rather to insure the dey was not given an 
exaggerated idea of the amount the Americans were willing to pay, and thus make 
American vessels more vulnerable to corsair attacks.147 
 Yet, demand by the American public that the American captives be ransomed and 
returned home led President Washington to send new instructions to American 
negotiators in Barbary in 1794.  While broad in nature, these instructions increased the 
amount the United States would pay per captive, but still kept a cap on how much tribute 
the United States could afford.  The four instructions were as follows:148 
• Ransom and peace are to go hand and hand, if practicable; but if 
peace cannot be obtained, a ransom is to be effected without delay. 
 
• After endeavoring to obtain a ransom, at the lowest possible rate, 
or at the rate allowed by Portugal, or other nations the least 
favored, you may if necessary go as far as three thousand dollars 
per man. 
 
• You will refer to the former instructions for the real wishes of the 
Government as to the sum to be paid for peace; keeping in mind 
the preference for a larger annuity and a smaller douceur in hand, 
to the reverse.  But we would not break for fifty thousand dollars 
per annum, and two hundred thousand dollars by way of douceur, 
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to secure a peace for the convenient term of years.  But, though 
this form of the thing is most eligible, yet it is not judged to be a 
sine qua non; for, after all, what is usual and effectual must decide, 
and the payment in gross may be accommodated to the necessity of 
accomplishing the object. 
 
• If, however, by any other modification of the sum of eight hundred 
thousand dollars, a peace and ransom can be obtained, you may 
modify accordingly; restricting yourself, on the head of a ransom, 
within the above mentioned limit of three thousand dollars per 
man. 
 
The United States pursued diplomacy throughout the 1790s at an enormous fiscal 
cost.  The 1795 treaty with Algiers required the United States pay approximately 
$642,500 USD, as well an annual amount of military stores, and another with Tunis in 
1799 stipulated the United States provide tribute of gunpowder and provisions.149  This 
sum, which is equal to about nine million USD in 2004150, was drastically reduced from 
the original demands.  Initially, the dey of Algiers had requested a sum of $2,247,000, 
broken down between presents for the dey, his family, various government employees, 
Grandees Houses in Algiers, and for the redemption of one hundred American 
captives.151   
The treaties themselves included provisions to pay for traditional peace presents, 
an annual payment to Algiers of 12,000 sequins (in cash or kind), and $585,000 for the 
captives and maintaining a future peace.152  It is uncertain as to why the Dey drastically 
decreased his demands for a treaty, especially after attempts had been made by David 
Humphreys, minister resident to Portugal, to negotiate a treaty similar to those terms 
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which the Dutch had received.  It is speculated that the Dey was irritated with the British, 
and therefore concluded a peace treaty with Britain’s enemies, the United States, as a 
show of disdain towards the British rather than satisfaction with the American tributary 
offer. 
Diplomacy, in the end, turned out to be an ineffective method for abolishing 
Barbary piracy.  American disdain for the paying tribute and bribes to the deys, a lack of 
adequate funds, and the regencies’ inclination to disregard treaties on a whim all 
influenced the decision to change the Barbary policy from weak diplomacy and 
appeasement to military action.  The United States had begun gradually building its Navy 
in 1794, and the Quasi War with France in 1798 forced further increases in naval 
development.  While employed as United States consul to Tripoli, William Eaton, in an 
1800 letter, commented on the fact that only a formidable show of force (or more) or 
consistent financial sacrifice would silence the deys and deter the corsair raids.153  In 
1803 Commodore Edward Preble commented in a letter to his wife that he was 
experiencing successful negotiations with Morocco; this came shortly after an extensive 
show of United States naval strength in the Mediterranean Sea, especially around Tripoli 
and Tunis.154  Both of these comments illustrate the necessity for military force if fair 
peace treaties were to be negotiated and upheld. 
As any sort of united international action against the Barbary corsairs was 
extremely difficult to coordinate, the young United States was forced to be the first state 
to break away from the humiliating system of bribes, threats and capitulation.155  
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Although the endless raids against American shipping should have signaled to the United 
States government the fact that force would be necessary in 1785, it took until 1801 for 
any military action to be ordered.  On February 6, 1802, Congress passed “an act for the 
protection of the commerce and the seamen of the United States against Tripolitan 
cruisers”, which awarded President Jefferson the use of the United States Navy in action 
against the corsairs.  President Jefferson ordered the officers to “subdue, seize and make 
prize of all vessels, goods, and effects belonging to the Dey of Tripoli”, and to advance 
with any measure “the state of war will justify”.156  Thus, in response to the 1801 
declaration of war against the United States by the regency of Tripoli, the United States 
began its first naval campaign in the Mediterranean. 
The military campaign began in 1801, when Commodore Richard Dale was given 
command of a squadron of four vessels that were dispatched to the Mediterranean Sea to 
protect American merchant shipping and block major Barbary ports.  Blockades were set 
up at Tunis and Tripoli, while other Tripolitan cruisers were being detained at Gibraltar, 
and a second squadron was sent to the Mediterranean after Dale returned home.  While 
the Americans did have some success in combat against the corsair ships (the USS 
Enterprize’s defeat of the Tripoli), the United States suffered major setbacks during the 
campaign.  Most prevalent was the capture of the USS Philadelphia and her 307 crew by 
Tripolitan gunboats.  Eventually the American vessels launched an assault, led by then 
Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, on the Philadelphia in order to destroy her and thus prevent 
the use of her by the Tripolitans.   
Despite this setback, the United States continued its harbor blockade and 
bombardment of Tripoli.  It seemed as though little was being accomplished however, 
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with the exception of angering the other Barbary regencies.  It was not until William 
Eaton’s successful assault, in cooperation with the Arab troops of Ahmad Qaramanli (the 
older brother of Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli, Dey of Tripoli), on the city of Derna that Yusuf 
Qaramanli agreed to negotiations.157 
Unfortunately, this did not spell the end of United States naval action in the 
Mediterranean.  Soon after the squadrons left, corsair raids on American merchant vessels 
resumed.  The attacks continued through 1815, but the United States was unable to deal 
with them before this date due to the War of 1812 with Britain.  On March 3, 1815, 
Congress declared war on Algiers, and President Madison deployed two squadrons to the 
Mediterranean to end Barbary piracy.158  Unlike the previous engagement, the 1815 War 
with Algiers brought a definitive end to corsair harassment of United States vessels 
because Madison ordered the squadron to win a lasting peace, and authorized an 
overwhelming show of force to do so.  Jefferson had attempted this “shock” approach, a 
military tactic that is still practiced in contemporary times, but was not nearly as 
successful as Madison, who managed to obtain peace treaties from Algiers, Tunis and 
Tripoli, none of which required any sort of tribute.  On the contrary, now Captain 
Stephen Decatur, designated peace commissioner along with Captain William 
Bainbridge, demanded and received retribution from the Deys of Tunis and Tripoli.159 
 
Outcomes 
 The United States’ courage to refuse to abide by a traditional system of blackmail, 
bribery and tribute has had lasting effects.  In addition to the growth of American naval 
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power, the United States’ actions in the Mediterranean helped contribute to the 
eradication of Barbary piracy (Tunis officially renounced piracy in 1819, and Great 
Britain and France began naval activities in the region during the 1820s and 1830s to 
ward off the corsairs)160, the notion of Gunboat Diplomacy, and a faith in the military’s 
role in negotiations (the view that a demonstration of strength can influence the role on 
the ground).161  Most importantly, it was a demonstration of American honor and 
morality, and set a precedent for future issues:  diplomacy before military intervention.  
While this has not always been the case since 1816, it is certainly a good policy to 
pursue. 
 Diplomacy in the Barbary era failed in part because of the United States’ inability 
to timely follow through on tribute payments.  The Barbary leaders’ impatience with the 
United States caused them to retract treaties and pursue further attacks against American 
commercial ships.  Further, the lack of a threat to the operations of corsairs allowed the 
privateers to pursue their attacks without consequence.  With the United States having no 
real power to persuade the Barbary leaders to honor their treaties or stop corsair raids 
against their ships, U.S. efforts to solve the problem diplomatically were essentially 
futile.  Likewise, the system of tribute failed for the United States.  Continuously paying 
off the Barbary leaders as stipulated by treaty negotiations did not work.  Rather, it 
exacerbated the situation, allowing the Barbary leaders to exact heftier tribute payments, 
and allowing their corsair fleets to continue attacks if payments were not received. 
 Military action, on the other hand, had the power to persuade the deys and beys of 
Barbary because it threatened the survival of the regencies.  The new United States Navy 
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could easily beat the corsair fleet, and destroy their home ports if necessary.  It had the 
ability to put an end to the revenues of the Barbary leaders, thus threatening both the 
economy and their power.  As a result, military action worked because the U.S. Navy did 
sufficient damage to the corsair ports and fleets in both the War with Tripoli and the War 
with Algiers to convince the leaders of the Barbary regencies that further attacks on and 




















Chapter 3:  Somali Pirates 
 Piracy is no stranger to the waters of the Indian Ocean off the East African coast.  
It is a business that has been practiced there since at least the ninth century BC.  The 
Strait of Hormuz, currently one of the most dangerous shipping zones in the world, was 
once part of a 150 mile long area known as the “Pirate Coast.”  Along this route pirates 
harassed Roman ships, Assyrian kings, and the fleet of Alexander the Great.162  Now at 
peril are any merchant vessels that dare enter the Gulf of Aden.  Despite efforts to deter 
Somali piracy, current policies seem to be lacking and ineffective.  And due to the 
massive problems Somalia faces, as well as the fact that the Gulf of Aden is too large to 
keep a continuous naval presence in, it is easy to understand why. 
 
Conflict 
The situation in Somalia is one of an internal conflict that is projecting itself 
outward, disrupting international commercial shipping in the process, and eliciting a 
strong legal and military response.  Political and economic conditions in Somalia have 
allowed corruption and lawlessness to take root in the country and become entrenched in 
society.  Since the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, Somalia, despite numerous 
attempts, has been unable to install an effective, stable government, and has thus become 
the ultimate example of a failed state.  Despite a common religion (Islam), a strong sense 
of national pride (seen when outside powers intervene), and shared financial strife, the 
clan divisions, economic hardship, and constant struggle for power between the warlords, 
Islamic Courts Union and al-Shabaab, and the Transitional Federal Government has 
                                                           




prevented stability in Somalia.  Somalia has traditionally been a clan-based, pastoral 
society, with its chief exports being livestock, hides, fish, charcoal and bananas.163  Also, 
while Somalia does have a textile and wireless communications industry, the 
overwhelming majority of the population is employed in the agricultural sector.  
However, drought and warring factions have wreaked havoc on the economy, and illegal 
fishing and waste dumping in Somalia’s territorial waters has only exacerbated the 
problem. 
Somali piracy started initially in the 1990s, when Somalis patrolled their coast 
line, protecting their territorial waters from illegal dumping and fishing.  Piracy itself did 
not become a lucrative business for the Somalis until approximately 2005, and was all but 
eradicated under the reign of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).  It resumed again with 
defeat of the ICU by Ethiopian troops, and increased dramatically throughout 2008 and 
2009.  The prosperous nature of piracy off the Horn of Africa drives pirates to search for 
commercial vessels far out to sea, encourages further attacks, and motivates young 
Somalis to join pirate organizations.  In a country where the GDP is approximately 600 
USD, multi-million dollar ransom payments are extremely lucrative, and provide a bright 
alternative to what would otherwise be an economically frustrating future.   
This is where the central conflict lies between the Somalis and the international 
community, including the United States.  For the shipping industry, piracy is a threat to 
the security of their crews, ships and cargoes.  It has the potential to disrupt trade and 
negatively affect individual states’ economies.  Piracy also violates international law, and 
distracts maritime and regional powers from focusing on other maritime threats such as 
                                                           




terrorism.  The case in Somalia is especially worrying in this regard because there is the 
potential for a piracy-terrorism nexus to form, and using resources to combat piracy takes 
focus off interrupting terrorist activities from al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab in the region. 
In addition, where diplomacy or sanctions would normally be applied to persuade 
a change in action, the lack of stable political institutions in Somalia makes such efforts 
almost pointless.  Due to the lack of law enforcement capabilities, the government is 
unable to enforce any anti-piracy policies it adopts.  Even military action in the region is 
having little effect.  Although the pirates have had lethal encounters with the French and 
American Navies, the military presence off the Horn of Africa has done little to deter 
piracy in the region. 
According to data from the International Maritime Organization and International 
Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services – International Maritime Bureau, the 
following chart illustrates the number of actual and attempted attacks from 1999 –2009.  
The data includes actual and attempted attacks in ports, as well as in territorial and 
international waters along the East African coast and in the Gulf of Aden.   










Year #umber of 
Ships 
1999    16 
2000    29 
2001 7 














Prior to 1991, Siad Barre had instituted a harsh, authoritarian regime after gaining 
power in 1969. This regime facilitated fighting between clan groups, a notion especially 
devastating to a society, like Somalia’s, where life traditionally centers around kin.164  
The policies Barre implemented devastated the economy, resulted in clan-government 
fighting throughout the 1980s, and helped fuel an economic and humanitarian crisis that 
resulted in continuous Somali dependence on foreign aid.  These issues had initially been 
created by European colonialism, when British and Italian notions of state and the 
external world market conflicted with the traditionally decentralized pastoral society.165  
When colonialism ended, the Somalis attempted implementing a democratic, 
parliamentary government, which resulted in disaster and the 1969 military coup that 
brought Siad Barre to power.   
Like many countries, Somalia was a proxy state during the Cold War.  Somalia 
had developed a relationship with the Soviet Union that led to its constant dependence on 
foreign aid (including military support), but turned to the United States for military, 
economic, and humanitarian aid after the Soviets began building stronger ties with 
Ethiopia in 1977.166  The continuous influx of military arms and equipment had 
devastating, lasting effects on Somalia.  Barre remained in power throughout the 1980s 
based on terror and the facilitation of clan rivalries.  At the same time, he further 
weakened the economy but continued to receive massive international assistance as 
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outside countries did little else to facilitate the end of the humanitarian crisis and severe 
instability within Somalia. 
Intense armed conflict in the country began in 1989, and culminated in the 
uprisings that caused Barre to flee.  After he left the capital, the country collapsed into 
complete chaos.  During the past nineteen years the international community has 
intervened a number of times, attempting to improve the humanitarian situation, foster 
political stability, and prevent a fundamentalist Islamist takeover of the government.   
Beginning in the early 1990s, the United Nations has kept a close watch on the 
situation in Somalia.  In 1992 it initiated the first incursion into the country, United 
Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I), consisting of 500 troops tasked to escort 
convoys delivering food relief supplies and protect aid workers.167  Unfortunately, due to 
clan fighting and resistance from Mogadishu, the operations were largely unsuccessful.  
Despite cease-fire agreements between the clans, fighting continued after troops arrived 
in September 1992, preventing seaborne supplies from being unloaded and dispersed to 
starving Somalis throughout the country.168 
After the frustration of UNOSOM I, the United Nations Security Council 
authorized the United Task Force (UNITAF), which was to last five months and be 
replaced by United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).  Under UNITAF, 
the participating member states were permitted to utilize necessary military force in order 
to protect the food relief being delivered and dispersed through Somalia.169  The United 
States, which contributed approximately 26,000 of the 37,000 personnel involved in 
UNITAF, led the largely successful mission.  The U.N. force was able to secure the main 
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ports and roads within a few weeks,170 and soon after relief supplies flowed freely to parts 
of Somalia where war, drought, and famine had left the population on the brink of 
starvation. 
 Hope for peace and future stability was further bolstered by a ceasefire 
agreement, signed on March 27, 1993, which stipulated that the warlords engage in 
complete disarmament.  This accord also gave U.N. forces the power to take strong 
actions against detractors of the ceasefire agreement.171  Unfortunately, none of the 
parties involved produced results by the time UNOSOM II commenced in May 1993, 
leaving the new, smaller U.N. contingent vulnerable to attack, and the country again on 
the verge of complete collapse.  Throughout 1993 concerns about Somalia’s deterioration 
turned into reality when twenty-four Pakistani blue berets were killed while attempting to 
inspect the arm stores of General Aideed, the most powerful man in Mogadishu, on June 
5.  After this incident, the United Nations sanctioned the use of helicopter gunship strikes 
against Aideed’s bases, and placed a price on his head.172 
 This all lead to the infamous ‘Black Hawk down’ incident in October 1993, when 
United States Black Hawk helicopters were shot down in Mogadishu, and the bodies of 
dead U.S. military personnel dragged through the streets for the world to see.  After the 
incident, United States president Bill Clinton pledged that all U.S. military personnel 
would be out of Somalia by the end of March 1994.  The other Western states soon 
followed suit, and only “Third Tier” troops were left to carry out the U.N. mission, now 
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downgraded to peace keeping from peace enforcement by March 1995.173  Overall, 
UNOSOM II was a failure, and, despite the success of UNITAF, Somalia slipped back 
into a state of chaos and devastation. 
 The latter half of the 1990s saw growth and movement towards stability in the 
northern break-away state of Somaliland.  Yet, further clan fighting, including conflict 
over control of banana exports, dominated southern Somalia, resulting in no 
improvement in the political, economic or security situation.  Peace conferences and an 
international push towards a stable government have dominated the international 
community’s involvement with Somalia during the twenty-first century, although the 
United States has refrained from active participation in international conferences.  In 
2000, the president of Djibouti initiated a new peace plan for Somalia under the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a local regional organization comprised of 
Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda.174  This conference, 
which brought together delegates representing all factions of Somali society, established 
a Transitional National Government (TNG) headed by Abdiqasim Salad Hassan.  It was 
believed Hassan could unify his clansmen in Mogadishu175 and begin a process of 
stability, pacification, and growth in Somalia.  Unfortunately, the unpopularity and 
inability of the TNG to retain control over Mogadishu proved to be too much, and the 
TNG ended as yet another unsuccessful attempt at Somali stability. 
 In 2002, another international conference was held in Kenya in hopes of finding a 
workable solution to Somalia’s problems.  These talks, unlike the ones in Djibouti, 
included all of the main warlords, in hopes that this would create more support for a new 
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government.  Eventually, after two years, massive European Union intervention, 
corruption, and allegations of vote buying, a new transitional government, as 
representative of the clans as the TNG, was formed, with Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf chosen 
as the provisional president.  The new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) returned 
to Somalia (though not to Mogadishu) in 2005, but never had any real power.  Rather, the 
warlords reverted back to their normal tactics, even forming the Alliance for the 
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism176 in an attempt to play a role the U.S. War 
on Terror (it is stipulated this alliance was backed by the Central Intelligence Agency).  
No doubt this was really a ploy to convince the international community, or at least the 
United States, that it would be beneficial for them if the warlords remained in power. 
 Partially due to a backlash against this counter-terrorism alliance, as well as a 
need to fill the void left in Somalia by the absence of law and order, the Islamic Courts 
Union, backed by local clan militias and business interests, began to obtain power in 
2006.177  Under the ICU, who made security its main issue, Somalia began to have some 
semblance of a stable state.  However, stability came at a steep price:  an oppressive 
regime that imposed harsh laws and took away freedoms of the Somali people.  Though 
appreciated by the Somali people for its contributions to security, the ICU was 
unacceptable elsewhere.  Allegations of sponsoring terrorism brought international 
disapproval of the regime, especially from the United States, and by the end of 2006 
Ethiopian troops and military equipment were rolling over the border into Somalia.  
Initial incursions between the Islamists and Ethiopians sent the Islamists retreating to 
their safe havens in Mogadishu, where, along with local clan militias, they largely ceased 
                                                           
176 Ibid, 85. 
177 Ibid, 86. 
64 
 
fighting due to an inability to challenge the more sophisticated weaponry of the 
Ethiopians.  This gave Yusuf, an ally to the Ethiopians, the opportunity to declare victory, 
and implement a number of harsh, oppressive measures that likened back to the days of 
Siad Barre’s regime.178  And like Barre’s policies, Yusuf’s contributed to increased 
insecurity, undermined his already shaky rule, and paralleled in 2007 the Somalia of the 
late 1980s, just before Barre’s fall. 
 Since the pull out of Ethiopian troops in December 2008, the political situation in 
Somalia has been a disaster.  The country is back in chaos (though it can be argued it 
never truly left it, even under the ICU), with constant fighting between the government 
and the militant wing of the ICU, al-Shabaab.  Piracy, which had been all but eradicated 
under the Islamic Courts Union, flared up in a big way, capturing the world’s attention in 




 Somali piracy has shifted in location in the last few years.  Prior to 2008, it was 
heavily centered off the coast of Southern Somalia, around Mogadishu.179  In the past two 
years, however, it has shifted north, and is now located primarily in central and northern 
Somalia, particularly off the coast of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland.  
Specifically, the coastal towns of Eyl, Garacad, Hobyo and Xarardheere have become 
major pirate centers, where hijacked ships are often taken while being held for ransom. 
                                                           
178 Ibid, 90. 
179 Middelton, 3. 
65 
 
 Originally, Somali piracy was located in the littoral waters off the coast, mainly 
targeting illegal fishing in the 1990s.  As pirates have become more ambitious during the 
twenty-first century however, warnings for international shipping have increased from 
staying at least fifty nautical miles away from the coast to six-hundred nautical miles 
away.180  Ships in the Gulf of Aden, a 550 mile long, 200 mile wide gauntlet between 
Somalia and Yemen that connects the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea and 
Western Indian Ocean, are currently the most prone to pirate attacks worldwide.  
Through the use of ‘motherships’, or hijacked fishing trawlers, pirates are able to attack 
vessels on the high seas hundreds of miles from the Somali coast.  For example, the 
Saudi-owned super-tanker, Sirius Star, was 420 nautical miles from the Somali coast 
when it was hijacked on November 15, 2008.181  
 Due to the dramatic rise in piracy since 2005, and especially since 2008, the Gulf 
of Aden is quickly becoming one of the more dangerous waterways in the world.  
Although the Strait of Malacca is still considered to be the most dangerous (because of its 
extremely narrow size and the fact that 50,000 ships pass through it per annum compared 
to 20,000 per annum in the Gulf of Aden), the increasing peril in the region is causing 
some shipping companies to consider re-routing vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, 
rather than have them navigate around the Horn of Africa.182  For sure, this will increase 
the price of goods normally shipped through the Gulf of Aden.  It is not clear what this 
will mean for Somali piracy, although it is possible the pirates will just re-focus their area 
of operations.  Attacks against vessels have previously moved north, and certainly can 
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move south.  Already there have been assaults on vessels to the south of Somalia, most 
notably an attack against a yacht near the Seychelles, located about 1,000 miles east of 
Kenya and northeast of Madagascar.183 
 
Characteristics 
 Many pirates are former members of the informal Somali coast guard that 
appeared in the 1990s in response to illegal fishing in Somalia’s territorial waters.  They 
are traditionally poor residents, often of coastal fishing villages, who have seen fishing 
revenues drastically decrease due to illegal fishing and toxic dumping.  These pirates are 
extremely familiar with waterways in the region as a result of their fishing experience, 
and are thus exceptionally capable of excelling in their enterprise.  
 Like the Barbary corsairs, the Somali pirates adhere to the Islamic faith.  
However, unlike the corsairs, religion plays no role in who the Somali pirates target.  
There is no jihad waged against Christian ships, and, as the attack on the Sirius Star 
illustrated, Somali pirates do not discriminate against ships based on their flag, cargo or 
crew.  For the Somalis, piracy is purely a business, and hijackings and hostage taking are 
means of making money, with multi-million dollar ransoms being the goal. 
 The only possible link religion has to piracy in Somalia is the notion that some 
revenues may be supporting the al-Shabaab fighters waging war against the TFG in hopes 
of re-instating the Islamic Courts Union.  There is, however, no solid proof of this idea.  
While highly possible, as a number of people, groups and towns do benefit from pirate 
revenues, the fact that the ICU almost eradicated piracy while it was in power (through 
                                                           




fear more so than stability or economic security) suggests the ICU does not approve of 
piracy, as it is un-Islamic, and wants nothing to do  with the practice.  Despite this, 
observers still worry about an Islamist-piracy connection, especially if it results in a 
piracy-terrorism (more specifically piracy-al-Qaeda) nexus.  Due to the different 
motivations of each group (money versus ideology) however, it is skeptical whether such 
a link will ever exist. 
 
Motivations 
 The main motivation behind Somali piracy is simple:  money.  There is no desire 
for power or influence, either domestically or internationally.  While a sum of the profits 
from pirate attacks is passed to important locals (government officials, warlords), the 
majority of the revenue is kept by the pirates.184  In an interview with 'ew York Times 
reporter Jeffery Gettleman, Sugule Ali, the spokesman for the pirate group that held the 
MV Faina in September 2008, explained that the pirates “just want the money.”185  Ali 
went on to say that the ransom money (20 million USD in cash) would be divided 
between all the men and used to fend off hunger, as hunger is their real enemy.  As for 
the cargo and the hostages, Ali stated they had no intention of selling weapons to anyone 
in Somalia, as the country had undergone enough chaos and devastation due to rampant 
fighting in the past eighteen years.  They also had no intent of killing the hostages, and 
believed they could all interact honorably because they are all human beings capable of 
treating one another with respect.  However, for some pirate groups, this final view has 
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certainly changed due to lethal actions taken by French commandoes, and especially 
since the Maersk Alabama incident, where U.S. Navy SEALS shot and killed three 
pirates holding Captain Richard Phillips hostage in April 2009. 
 Pirate organizations like Ali’s, the Central Region Coast Guard, view themselves 
not as pirates (or ‘sea-bandits as it is translated) but rather as a patrol organization, 
similar to a coast guard, that is protecting Somali waters from illegal fishing and toxic 
waste dumping.186  In fact, the pirates that hijacked the French cruise vessel Le Ponant in 
2008 claimed to be part of the Coast Guard, informing the crew that they had started as 
vigilante fishermen who robbed foreign boats smuggling contraband to and from Somalia 
in the early 1990s.  Groups such as these, of which there are believe to be four or five in 
Puntland alone, are large (the ‘Coast Guard’ reportedly has upwards of 400 members) 
and formed on clan-based alliances.187 
 Nonetheless, these “patrols” are bringing in massive revenue that is helping boost 
the economic situation in the pirate towns.  In 2008, Somali pirates earned between thirty 
million and forty million USD, collecting at least one million USD per ransomed ship.188  
The result is that the pirate villages are starting to have a vastly different look from the 
rest of Somalia.  In Eyl, the landscape has transformed from just a few tin-roofed shacks 
to a booming town that has several new restaurants, 4x4s racing around, gunmen showing 
off their new weapons, and “middlemen” in suits punching numbers into state-of-the-art 
cell phones.189 
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 This is in stark contrast to the economic situation of the majority of Somalia.  In a 
country that experiences frequent drought and has an economy heavily based on 
livestock, especially cattle (an industry that fluctuates depending on world demand and 
trade barriers), life is often bleak.  Food is scarce and starvation rampant, making piracy a 
lucrative prospect.  Ironically, the presence of pirates prohibits World Food Program 
vessels from delivering desperately needed supplies (unless escorted by military 
convoys)190, making the economic and humanitarian situation even worse. 
 
Targets 
 While no vessels, except maybe navy ships, are safe from pirate attacks, some are 
more vulnerable than others.  Vessels that have low sides, travel at low speeds, do not 
have a large crew, and lack adequate watch-keep capabilities are the most susceptible to 
attacks.191  In terms of cargo, the pirates do not discriminate.  They are just in it for the 
money.  Pirates will attempt to hijack any vessel they see as illegally traveling in their 
waters, especially those that are likely to yield a high ransom payment.  Also, the pirates 
are not intimidated by the flag a merchant vessel is flying; they will attack any and all 
ships if possible.  Thus far, it has been reported that pirates have attempted or 
successfully hijacked ships either owned by or flying flags from Norway, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, the Philippines, Germany, Ukraine, Egypt, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia, Antigua and Barbuda, France, Italy, Belgium, Lebanon, Greece, Togo and the 
Netherlands. 
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'ature and Frequency of Attacks 
 Somali pirate attacks are violent in nature, and have evolved from opportunistic 
raids to sophisticated operations.  Launched from motherships, they exist of up to three 
swifts (high speed boats), and carry around ten men among the three vessels.192  
Motherships are often large fishing trawlers, like the one spotted by Le Ponant just before 
it was boarded.  That particular ship was typical of a local fishing boat seen in the region, 
being approximately 150 feet long and having “a rugged oceangoing appearance.”193  The 
pirates often have global positioning systems (stolen from hijacked ships), satellite 
phones, night vision goggles, and access to shipping information from ports in the Gulf, 
Europe and Asia.  From the time of sighting, it can take as little as fifteen minutes for a 
pirate boat to reach and board a vessel.  As the pirates carry automatic weapons, 
ammunition, and often rocket propelled grenades, merchant vessels are almost powerless 
against the pirates, especially if no naval vessels are nearby.  
 The main tactic favored by Somali pirates, like the Barbary corsairs, is boarding.  
Armed with grappling hooks, ladders, and sophisticated weaponry, they have the ability 
to intimidate and often quickly overcome a crew.  While pirate attacks have historically 
been committed during the day, they are increasingly being carried out under the cover of 
darkness.  Once a ship has been boarded and the crew subdued, the pirates proceed to 
execute what is called a control, where everything on the ship is searched.194 
 Since attacks are transforming from crimes of opportunity to sophisticated, 
planned missions, the frequency of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden is on the rise.  
Theoretically, access to data on shipping schedules allows the pirates to precisely plan 
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attacks, which, despite the large international naval presence in the region, could lead to a 
further increase in attacks.  In 2008 alone there were 111 attempted attacks, 42 of which 
were successful.195  In 2009, there were 61 attacks within the first quarter of the year.  In 
January alone, out of reported instances, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 
estimated that one in six vessels traversing the region were attacked.   By mid-May this 
number had risen to 71, with 14 successful hijackings.196  By the end of the year the 
number of reported attacks was up to 194. 
 
Treatment of Hostages 
 As Sugule Ali stated in his interview, the hostages on the Faina were treated 
humanely.  The pirates ate and conversed, to the best of their ability, with the mostly 
Ukrainian crew during the Faina’s detention.197  Like the Barbary corsairs, the Somali 
pirates recognize the importance of their hostages, and understand that one reason the 
companies pay ransoms is so their ships, cargoes and crew remain unharmed.  To help 
facilitate the well-being of the captives, an illicit catering industry has developed in 
Somalia that helps feed and care for the hostages while they await ransom.  The crew of 
Le Ponant had what can be considered a surprising experience with their Somali captors, 
who turned out to be more civilized than the French crew expected.  According to the 
published report of the ship’s captain, the Somalis allowed the crew to prepare and enjoy 
French cuisine and wine, play cards and board games (including Trivial Pursuit, 
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Monopoly, and Pictionary), and even celebrate a crew member’s birthday.198  
Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether or not future French hostages will afforded the 
same treatment.  After the lethal encounters with the French Navy and United States 
Navy, Somali pirate groups have pledged to kill any future French or American hostages 
as revenge for the deaths of their fellow pirates. 
 
Actions Taken to Combat Piracy 
 To date, much as been done to combat the threat of piracy in East Africa, but little 
has been achieved.  Legally, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1846, 
unanimously adopted on December 2, 2008, allows states and regional organizations to 
use ‘all necessary means’ (an unusual move by the U.N.) to fight piracy off the coast of 
Somalia for a twelve month period.199  After receiving a letter dated December 9, 2008 
from the Somali Transitional Federal Government requesting international help to 
“interdict those who use Somali territory and airspace to plan, facilitate or undertake acts 
of piracy and armed robbery at sea,” the Security Council recalled Resolution 1846 (as 
well as Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838 and 1844, all Resolutions on the situation in 
Somalia adopted in 2008), and implemented Resolution 1851 on December 16, 2008.  
This resolution called on all states, regional and international organizations that have the 
capacity to do so, to actively participate in the fight against maritime piracy and armed 
robbery “by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft and through seizure and 
disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of 
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piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.”  As prosecuting suspected or 
actual pirates is currently difficult for the international community, the resolution also 
invites “special agreements or arrangements with countries willing to take custody of 
pirates…to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of persons detained as a result of 
operations conducted under this resolution for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off 
the coast of Somalia.”  To date, only Kenya, France and the United States seem willing to 
detain and prosecute pirates, with heavy reliance being placed on the over-taxed judicial 
system in Kenya. 
 Actions taken by the United States have been in accordance with U.N. mandates, 
as well as U.S. maritime security provisions.  In addition, after the April 2009 hostage 
crisis, where American captain Richard Phillips of the Maersk Alabama was held for four 
days, the United States Senate passed Senate Resolution 108 of the 111th United States 
Congress titled “A Resolution Commending Captain Richard Phillips, the Crew of the 
“Maersk Alabama”, and the United States Armed Forces, Recognizing the growing 
Problem of Piracy Off Somalia’s Coast, and Urging the Development of a 
Comprehensive Strategy to Address Piracy and its Root Causes”, and the United States 
House of Representatives is currently considering the “United States Mariner and Vessel 
Protection Act of 2009” (HR 2984).  The Senate Resolution suggests that the President of 
the United States of America work with the international community and Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat piracy 
and its causes; the House Resolution is intended to assist in the defense of United States-
flagged vessels against piracy and guarantee the right of self-defense against piracy, and 
suggests allowing the United States Coast Guard to deploy a maritime safety and security 
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team to prevent and respond to acts of piracy in international waters.  This would require 
the Secretary of the Coast Guard to work through the International Maritime 
Organization to establish coordinated actions.  Also it outlines under what circumstances 
armed force can be used. 
 In terms of military action, France and the United States have been the leaders in 
aggressively combating Somali piracy.  The French Navy has maintained a large 
presence in the region, especially since the Le Ponant hijacking in 2008, and in the past 
two years French commandoes have detained or killed a number of pirates.  In addition, 
the Maersk Alabama crisis, which ended when U.S. Navy SEALS on the USS Bainbridge 
(named for Captain William Bainbridge, once a Barbary hostage and captain of a U.S. 
Navy ship sent to combat the Barbary corsairs) shot and killed three Somali pirates, 
highlighted the willingness of the United States to use lethal force against Somali pirates.  
Also, the United States has been a lead participant in Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-
150), an international naval coalition originally tasked with counter-terrorism operations 
around the Horn of Africa.200  Due to the rise of piracy in the region, CTF-150 has also 
been tasked to act as a deterrent in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean.  In 
January 2009, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which had previously established a 
Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in August 2008, announced the launching of a 
new Combined Task Force 151.  CTF-151 focuses solely on the counter-piracy mission 
in east Africa, allowing CTF-150 to concentrate on counter-terrorism initiatives. 
 Finally, shipping companies have been urged to take on-board defensive 
measures.  Suggestions have been made to arm the ships with private security guards, and 
                                                           





the private security firm Blackwater has offered its services.  As there are a number of 
problems with this policy (i.e. it may escalate violence, and many ports refuse to allow 
armed ships to dock), the more preferred methods include using fire hoses, carpet tacks, 
deck patrols, the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) system that broadcasts translated 
warnings to pirates at uncomfortably high volumes, and Active Denial Systems (ADS) 
which emit directional high-powered wave beams of energy that create unbearable 
burning sensations on the skin.201  Vessels can attempt traveling in waters guarded by 
naval ships, using a convoy approach of sorts, but because the area is so vast this is likely 
to be rather difficult.  Some vessels utilize every possible measure to keep from being 
hijacked, including hurling produce at boarding pirates, as Filipino crew members on one 
ship did when they pelted pirates with tomatoes in an attempt to thwart an attack.202  
There was even an instance where a tugboat set itself into a high-speed spin until the 
pirates pursuing the vessel abandoned the attack. 
 
Outcomes 
 Despite the numerous tactics in place for fending off pirate attacks, mixed results 
have been achieved.  While the on-board deterrents, with the exception of the tomatoes, 
can repel pirates, they do not always work.  Also, even with the large naval presence in 
the region, pirate attacks are still a common occurrence.  The vast area in the Gulf of 
Aden and the Western Indian Ocean means that warships are only able to scare off pirates 
if they are close to the vessel under attack.  Plus, the pirate skiffs are quicker than the 
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bulky warships, making it easier for them to outmaneuver the naval patrols.  As for the 
arrests and trials that do occur, these are doing nothing to end the spread of piracy in East 
Africa.  After all just about anywhere is better than Somalia, even an American or French 
prison. 
 Though Somalia has a government willing to negotiate on ways to halt piracy, the 
lack of stable political institutions and effective law enforcement agencies within Somalia 
means diplomatic pursuits are not going to achieve the desired results.  While negotiating 
with the powerful local warlords could be attempted, it too would likely have little, if 
any, effect, as these individuals are thought to be reaping a share of the profits from 
piracy.  And, like the case with Barbary, paying ransoms to pirates does not end the 
conflict.  Rather, it emboldens pirates to partake in further attacks in pursuit of higher 
ransom payments, and thus further profits. 
 While military action has not completely halted Somali piracy, it has had some 
success.  Naval ships in the region have interrupted attacks in progress, interdicted 
suspicious vessels, and detained suspected pirates for prosecution.  The U.S. Navy has 
the technological capabilities to overpower the pirates, and is working with an 
international coalition, backed by U.N. Resolutions, working to do so.  Overall, though 
the military solution has brought only small victories, it has had more success in halting 







Chapter 4:  Analysis 
 There are a number of similarities and differences between the Barbary and 
Somali cases that are important to note before examining the current options the United 
States has for combating maritime piracy.  The time frame of the cases is important 
because it illustrates a valuable lesson for countering modern piracy.  Conflict between 
the U.S. and Barbary regencies began in 1783 and lasted until 1816, a total of thirty-three 
years.  The conflict between Barbary and Europeans and Americans combined, however, 
lasted for almost four centuries, from the sixteenth century through the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Despite battles that drastically reduced the power of the corsair fleet by the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, the Europeans saw no need to entirely eradicate 
piracy.  They viewed the corsairs as a nuisance at worst, and used them as allies against 
their enemies when needed.  As a result the corsairs of the Barbary regencies were 
allowed to plague Mediterranean shipping well into the nineteenth century.  From this 
experience the United States needs to take away the fact that piracy needs to be dealt with 
at the onset.  Somali piracy, which began initially in the 1990s and increased dramatically 
starting in 2008, needs to be curbed now before it further entrenches itself into Somali 
society and becomes a long-lasting, widespread threat. 
 Despite the differences in longevity, era, and precise location, similarities 
between the Barbary and Somali cases can be drawn.  For one, there is no doubt that the 
Barbary corsairs and the Somali pirates can be characterized as dangerous and a major 
menace to shipping.  Attacks were violent, but it was imperative to both the corsairs and 
the pirates to keep the crews alive and safe.  Both were motivated by money, and 
extracted immense ransom payments for the release of hostages.  Also, the current 
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pirates, like the corsairs, are incredibly well organized.  They operate near important 
shipping lanes, and are part of sophisticated, hierarchical networks.  Although piracy is a 
crime of opportunity, both groups were able to carry out frequent attacks against their 
adversaries in vast bodies of water.  Finally, both proved difficult to solve.  The United 
States exhausted money, pursued fruitless diplomatic solutions, and engaged in two wars 
before finally defeating the Barbary threat.  As for the Somali case, the pirates have been 
resilient; they have not ceased attacks despite the presence of a coalition naval force 
patrolling the waters in the Gulf of Aden. 
 However, there are also a number of dissimilarities that are important to note.  
First, although financial gain was important to both groups, the motivations of each were 
different.  The Barbary corsairs were operating as part of a holy war against Christianity, 
and thus were targeting Christian shipping and crews, with the ransom payments being a 
secondary motivation for corsair attacks.  The Somali pirates, on the other hand, are 
solely motivated by the proceeds they will receive from ransom payments.  Targets of 
corsair attacks differed from that of Somali pirates basically because of the differing 
motivations.  The Somali pirates will attack any ship, no matter what flag it is flying; the 
corsairs specifically targeted ships flying the flags of Christian countries.   
Another important difference is the size and makeup of the corsair fleets versus 
the pirate skiffs.  Corsair vessels were roughly the same size as commercial vessels, and 
even some naval ships.  Thus, ships could easily be boarded or do battle with one 
another.  This is not the case with the Somali pirates.  The small fishing trawlers and 
high-powered speed boats used by the pirates are no match for the enormous warships 
deployed in the region, making any use of military force difficult within the constraints of 
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international law.  Finally, the characteristics of the corsairs and pirates are quite 
different.  While the Somali pirates do belong to large networks that extend into all levels 
of Somali society, these networks do not have the same caliber of structure the Barbary 
regencies did.  In Barbary, there was a central ruler who authorized corsair raids, and the 
corsairs functioned as an extension of government power.  The Barbary leader was an 
extremely important figure, as he was the one who negotiated peace treaties and tribute 
payments, and the one who had to be appeased in order for the agreements to be 
implemented. 
 The politics of Barbary, in particular Tripoli and Algiers, were incredibly 
important to the conflict, and just as important as politics in Somalia are in regards to the 
current issue, just in a different way.  Barbary corsairs were state sanctioned, and turned a 
portion of their revenues over to the state as a result.  When compared with the current 
pirate threat, this fact made finding a solution to the problem easier.  As a result of state 
involvement in acts of piracy, the United States had a concrete person to negotiate with.  
This was fortunate once the situation worsened, as United States leaders only needed to 
influence the sole leader of a Barbary regency that it was in his best interest to cease 
corsair raids against U.S. ships.   The Barbary situation is greatly different from the 
current state of affairs in Somalia, where politics matter only because the lack of stable 
political institutions is allowing Somali piracy to flourish.  The lack of a strong central 
government and effective law enforcement capabilities means any U.S. negotiations with 
the TFG to end piracy are essentially futile, and makes finding an effective end-all 
solution incredibly difficult. 
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 There were two main options the United States considered in dealing with 
Barbary:  live with it as a nuisance as the Europeans did, which meant constantly 
negotiating treaties and providing tribute payments, or military action.  Learning the 
lessons from the Barbary era is crucial for developing an effective, concrete strategy for 
dealing with modern piracy.  These two options can, and were applied to the Somali case, 
albeit in different ways due to the change in circumstances.  Negotiations now are not 
done in conjunction with ransom payments.  Nor are they really a feasible solution to the 
Somali situation.  Also, the official U.S. policy now is that the United States does not pay 
ransoms to pirates.  The payments that do get made are from the private shipping 
companies, and, like the Barbary case, fail to solve the problem.  International military 
action has been pursued thus far, although again, in a different way.  Unlike in the 
Barbary era, military force cannot be used to bombard ports and wage all-out 
conventional combat against modern piracy.  Rather, it must be used as it has, most 
notably by the United States and France - as a deterrent to pirate attacks, and in 
interdiction, hostage rescue, and detention situations. 
  After examining these two cases, a number of conclusions about the United 
States’ ability to combat maritime piracy can be drawn.  First, the main motivation of 
piracy in general is money.  Cut the money supply, make the risk outweigh the reward, 
and piracy will decrease.  Obviously, this task is much easier said than done.  But as both 
the Barbary and Somali cases have shown, pirates know that governments or shipping 
companies will pay ransoms in order to free their captive ships, crews and cargoes. As 
these payments bring in large revenues for the pirates, ransom payments do not work to 
stop piracy.  Rather, they give pirates more incentive to continue attacking ships.  While 
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it does mean the safe return of a ship, cargo and crew (in the Somali case), paying 
ransoms also makes the situation worse, and makes pirate-prone waters even more 
dangerous.  If ransom payments continue as the main modus operandi for dealing with 
piracy, then the international community will be back to where it was when the 
Europeans dealt with the Barbary corsairs during the sixteenth, seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries:  treating piracy as a necessary nuisance rather than an economic, 
regional, and international security threat. 
  The cultural and religious aspects of formulating responses in both cases are 
minimal, at best.  Cultural and religious sensitivity is a necessary part of diplomacy, and 
there is no doubt that diplomatic relations are beneficial and need to be maintained.  
Though the American diplomatic approach to the Barbary States acknowledged and 
attempted this sensitivity, it eventually had to be abandoned for the sake of national 
security.  Economic and national security interests sometimes continue to trump religion 
and culture, even among Islamic states.  In the Somali case, both Pakistan and Turkey 
have contributed to either CTF-150 or CTF-151. 
 Comparison of the Barbary corsairs and Somali pirates shows that out of 
everything the pirates target, the crew is the most valuable commodity.  During the 
Barbary era governments would pay large ransoms to free their sailors, and Somali pirate 
negotiations have shown modern shipping companies are willing to do the same.  A line 
of reasoning stands that the larger the crew or cargo one has, the more ransom one can 
demand for it.  While smaller crews are thus likely cheaper to ransom, and also cheaper 
in terms of operations, they make vessels more vulnerable to hijackings because smaller 
crews are more easily overcome.  As such, every precaution needs to be taken by ship 
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owners, as well as the crew, to protect crew members.  Mariners need to be alert while 
traversing dangerous waters, and must be aware of and understand proper defense 
mechanisms, as pirate attacks are violent and can occur at any time.  The United States 
cannot afford (for political, economic, and diplomatic reasons) to have another incident 
like the one Captain Bainbridge encountered during the War with Tripoli in 1803, when 
his ship, the USS Philadelphia, ran aground outside the harbor of Tripoli, and the ship 
and crew were captured by the enemy.  It is unclear what U.S. action would be if an 
entire American crew were to be held hostage by Somali pirates, but it would likely take 
more than three Navy SEALs to solve the crisis. 
 Another conclusion that can be drawn from the comparison is the notion of 
violence begets violence, as in both cases increased force by the United States lead to 
increased threats and hostilities on the part of its adversary.  Lessons from the Barbary 
wars tell us that the enemy needs to be completely overwhelmed in order to cease attacks.  
The show of force during the War with Tripoli was not enough of a deterrent, among 
other reasons, for Algiers and the other Barbary regencies against attack U.S.-flagged 
commercial vessels.  Because Somali pirates have already vowed revenge for the killing 
of three pirates, the United States, and the international community at large, needs to 
make sure violence does not escalate further, as that would cause the situation to further 
deteriorate.  Talk has been made of possible military incursion into Somalia’s shores, not 
just on the seas.  This type of military operation is what needs to be avoided, as it would 
likely increase the frequency and violent nature of pirate attacks, and also escalate the 
level of clan and Islamist fighting on shore. 
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 The root causes of Somali piracy are not going to be eradicated by military action 
on Somali soil.  In general, ending piracy depends on the type (corsair/privateer versus 
pirate), location, and players involved.  Military force worked with Barbary because the 
United States was dealing with a government that needed to look after its own interests, 
which included maintaining power.  In the Strait of Malacca, which will be returned to 
later, littoral patrols, not major naval operations, are what drastically reduced the number 
of pirate incidences by 2008.  The case so far in Somalia is that the massive naval 
presence is not as effective as had been hoped.  It is going to take more than warships 
patrolling the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean to end Somali piracy.  
Unfortunately, the real solutions, a stable government and steady economy, currently are 
not viable options. 
 Since naval force is what was used the last time the United States encountered 
acts of piracy, and currently seems like the only viable alternative, it is important to 
discuss what the United States Navy can learn from its previous experiences, and how 
battling Somali piracy will be different from tackling the Barbary corsairs.  During the 
Barbary era, the U.S. faced a threat that by today’s standards would be easy to counter.  
For one, they had the option of diplomacy to work out peace treaties.  Also, the naval 
force of the corsairs was more on par with that of the United States, and engaged in 
traditional combat tactics.  The U.S. Navy was facing a threat that had ships similar in 
size and maneuverability to its own fleet.  This is certainly not the case today.   
 Somali pirates operate in much smaller vessels, and lack the capabilities to engage 
a modern warship in battle.  Thus, the various major maritime powers patrolling the Gulf 
of Aden face the problem of how to deal with irregular maritime warfare.  As the pirates 
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do not seemed phased by the massive naval presence, the warships need to prove they are 
indeed a danger to the pirates.  Unfortunately, doing so within the context of international 
law and without losing international support for operations is going to be easier said than 
done.  As easy as utterly destroying pirate vessels would be, it would also be a violation 
of proportional response under the jus in bello tenet of just war theory.  Although the 
U.S. is not waging a war against the Somali pirates, it is still a good notion to follow, as it 
is too expensive, unnecessary, and inhumane to utilize highly sophisticated weaponry 
against a less advanced threat.  If the United States Navy wants to effectively counter 
piracy, it is going to have to do what it did once the U.S. realized the Barbary regencies 
needed to be dealt with using force:  build a naval fleet to defeat the pirates.  Obviously 
this is incredibly expensive, but fortunately it is already partially underway.  The United 
States began creation of a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program in 2003 as part of a 
transformation of its surface combatant fleet.  More about this will be discussed later, but 
the LCS is a good start at a military counter to piracy (to name one threat), as it is able to 
move more quickly and in littoral waters, rather than being forced to remain out to sea.  
What the United States needs first, however, is a detailed policy addressing the 
issue of piracy.  Before the U.S. could take action against the Barbary corsairs, the 
government had to determine its goals, and under what circumstances a navy could be 
formed to counter the corsair threat.  While the Bush administration passed some 
legislation in the summer of 2007, the Obama administration needs to decide if it will 






 To develop a strategy to combat modern Somali piracy, the United States, Navy 
included, needs to examine and learn from its past experiences.  It needs to understand 
the lessons of Barbary, and determine which of these do and do not apply to the current 
problem.  There are several broad themes that can be pulled from the Barbary case, each 
further broken down into specific lessons.  These include:   
• Diplomacy 
 
• Tribute or Ransom Payments 
 
• Political Stability 
 
• Best Safety Practices 
 
• International Cooperation 
 
• Military Action 
Many of these themes are not mutually exclusive of one another.  This is 
especially true of diplomacy and tribute payments during the Barbary era.  Immediate 
ransoms and annual tribute payments to the Barbary leaders were an essential part of 
negotiations.  The treaties agreed upon by the Barbary regencies and United States were 
often ineffective to begin with, as the deys and beys were apt to disregard them at any 
moment.  Hefty tribute demands, which were an essential part of the final treaty, 
essentially caused the failure of diplomatic negotiations, as the U.S. was often unable to 
produce on these demands.  The lesson here is to keep diplomacy and ransom payments 
separate.  In concern to diplomacy in the Somali case, the government itself will not be 
the entity the international community has to negotiate with, as it is willing to do what is 
possible to halt piracy.  Rather, if there is any one group in power the U.S. could 
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negotiate with to stop piracy, it is the warlords.  However, dealing with them will liken 
back to dealing with the Barbary leaders.  These individuals desire money and power.  
They are seeing profits from the current pirate raids, so for the United States to convince 
them to eradicate piracy they must be given an incentive, most likely in a financial form, 
before they take any action against piracy.  The problem here, besides how it will be 
perceived by the international community, is that after an initial show of cooperation and 
decrease in incidences of piracy, the pursuit of self-interests by the warlords, like those of 
the Barbary leaders, will allow attacks to resume. 
As for ransom payments, the Barbary case illustrated how appeasement failed to 
end the problem.  Fortunately, here the United States has learned its lesson from Barbary.  
The U.S. does not treat piracy as nuisance as the European powers of the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries did.  Rather, it adopted a stern stance not to pay 
ransoms to pirates.  Ransom payments will not solve the conflict, but if they are to be 
pursued, that decision should be left to the shipping companies. 
An important lesson to be taken away from the Barbary era is how crucial 
economic prosperity is for political stability.  The revenues the corsairs brought in to the 
regencies helped the leaders of Barbary retain their power.  For Somalia, political 
stability is the key to solving the problem.  Unfortunately, the lack of law enforcement 
institutions and economic opportunity in Somalia make stability a monumental challenge 
that will take years to achieve.   
During the Barbary era, safety measures were taken by both individual ships and 
naval patrols.  Commercial vessels were prone to attack from similar size corsair vessels, 
which were known to fly false flags or feign friendship to initially disarm their 
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opponents.  If equipped with the necessary weapons, these ships were sometimes able to 
fend off capture in battle.  Combined with the fact that some crews were able to repel 
pirates once aboard through hand-to-hand combat, this notion that safety measures were 
effective against the Barbary corsairs illustrates the necessity for the United States to now 
encourage commercial ships to utilize on-board deterrents and practice evasive 
maneuvering and other best practice measures. 
Finally, there are lessons to be learned about international cooperation and 
military intervention.  Despite the fact that the European powers kept naval vessels in the 
Mediterranean Sea to improve negotiations with the deys and beys of Barbary when 
necessary, there was never any cooperation to bring a complete end to the threat of 
Barbary piracy.  The United States has already shown it has learned to do otherwise, 
participating in CTF-151 operations with international partners.  Further, the Navy has 
shown that it learned from the mistakes of Barbary when it took immediate action by 
sending warships to the Horn of Africa to act as a deterrent.  It has shown a good start to 
protecting commercial vessels, but like the early years of the Barbary era, it still has a 
long way to go. 
 
Security Implications 
 So what does all of this mean?  How have the Barbary corsairs and Somali pirates 
affected regional and international security, and what, if any, are the implications for the 
future?  Comparatively speaking, the Barbary corsairs were more of a nuisance than a 
threat.  Regional stability was not threatened; there were multiple regencies along the 
North African coast, aligned under the Ottoman sultan, which all had the same objective, 
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and thus were not going to go to war with one another.  If the government of one felt 
slighted because another regency’s administration was able to broker a more beneficial 
‘peace’ agreement, action and anger was taken against the Christian state in question.  
The Barbary corsairs were more of a threat to what could then be considered the 
‘international community’ than they were to regional security.  This threat, however, was 
minimal for the major naval powers.  As the United States had no real navy to speak of, it 
was a chief security issue that threatened the lives of its sailors, as well as the U.S. 
economy.  For the Europeans who had strong navies, the importance of Mediterranean 
commerce trumped the threat.  Indeed, they were able, in some cases, to use the Barbary 
corsairs to their advantage.  The Europeans were each other’s enemies, and by striking a 
deal with the regencies, they could indirectly wage war on one another while securing 
their own economic advantage.  For the United States though, the corsairs and their acts 
of piracy were a major security problem.  And this is an issue that still plagues the United 
States to this day, except it has now grown into one that vexes the international 
community as well. 
 Somali piracy is much different from that of the Barbary corsairs.  While some of 
the ends and means are still the same, the international community’s ability to deal with 
them is not.  Unlike the corsairs, the pirates are contributing to regional instability.  While 
the situation in Somalia has not been stable in decades, piracy has only made it worse.  
And security in the region, both in East Africa and the Middle East, is rather unstable at 
times.  Any economic effect on the littoral or regional states, or increased animosity due 
to the naval patrols in the area has the ability to threaten the security and stability of 
countries in the region.   
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 For the international community, Somali piracy is now a wide concern.  Because 
the dynamics are different from the Barbary corsairs, as well as from other regions where 
states had to deal with rampant piracy (the Strait of Malacca, for example), the threat to 
shipping in the Gulf of Aden demands immediate and constant attention, and needs to be 
addressed and dealt with now so that it does not drag on for centuries.  Fortunately, the 
increased risks to shipping in an increasingly interdependent world have forced the 
international community to recognize the immediate and long term consequences of 
allowing Somali piracy to run rampant in East Africa, and have pushed a number of 
major naval powers into action.  This common threat has the positive effect of bolstering 
international cooperation, which has the possibility to further strengthen international 
relationships to combat future threats. 
 The implications of this case study tell us that the response to piracy is determined 
by the type, locations, and dynamics of the organizations.  If it is state sponsored, we 
know that a strong naval contingent is capable of halting pirate attacks.  However, state 
sanctioned piracy seems to be the exception to the rule now, as irregular warfare pitting 
regional or transnational organizations against traditional powers becomes the dominant 
trend.  Governments and their corresponding navies need to adapt to these changes, and 
look at their past experiences, both on land and at sea, with non-traditional actors in order 
to develop a comprehensive strategy to fight piracy; the threats the world will face in the 
future are too great to risk not doing so. 
 Again, if Somali piracy is not stopped it has the potential to destabilize part of the 
region.  There is concern that piracy may pick up in other states, especially in ones where 
the government is weak or lacks counter-measures.  This could have an adverse effect on 
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the world economy, as once shipping companies deem it too dangerous to ship goods 
through the Suez Canal and into the Gulf of Aden (or vice versa), they are going to start 
re-routing them around the Horn of Africa.  While this does lower the insurance 
premiums on a company’s vessels, it also adds extra costs, which are then tacked onto the 
cost of the good to the consumer.  With no end in sight for the current economic crisis, 
these extra costs cannot be incurred. 
 In addition, there is the international concern about Islamic extremist groups 
increasing their maritime attacks in the future.  While a piracy-terrorism nexus is unlikely 
due to the differing motivations of the organizations, there is a good chance that terrorist 
groups benefit from the pirates.  It is already speculated that al-Qaeda linked al-Shabaab 
is reaping the rewards of piracy in Somalia, and the chaos in the state makes it ideal for 
terrorist organizations to operate in virtually undetected.  If terrorist attacks are carried 
out in the countries surrounding the Gulf of Aden, or against vessels in the region (as has 
already been seen with the attack against the USS Cole in 2000 when it was targeted in 
the Yemini port of Aden), regional and international security are both going to be at risk.  
Also, if terrorists are driven from operating on land to operating at sea, they may look to 
pirates to learn how proceed with operations.  If pirate tactics are mimicked, it will be 
extremely difficult for the conventional navies to distinguish what group carried out the 
attack until some responsibility is claimed.   
Unfortunately for modern navies, keeping up with the ever-changing nature of 
asymmetric threats is no easy task.  While CTF-150 and CTF-151 are a start, the bulky 
warships are not always effective, and as the Cole incident showed, are prone to attacks 
themselves.  Thus, navies need to develop strategies to deter threats and adapt to new 
91 
 
adversaries.  The United States Navy, with its forthcoming LCS fleet and UAV 
surveillance capabilities, is certainly on the way to doing just this.  And continuing to 
work with international partners in the interest of regional, global, economic, and 
personal security will certainly augment naval measures, and legitimize and bolster 
efforts to combat piracy. 
 
Options Available to Combat Piracy 
 The prime solution to ending Somali piracy is a strong, stable Somali government.  
This fact cannot be reiterated enough, because all other options are not addressing the 
root causes of piracy.  Only a government that is able to overcome the fighting that has 
existed in Somalia for almost two decades, as well as the lawlessness that is rampant in 
the country, can stamp out piracy.  Somalia needs an effective judicial system, law 
enforcement sector, and coast guard to be able to curb piracy through the threat of 
prosecution and punishment.  It can be argued that Somalia had achieved this during the 
short rule of the Islamic Courts Union.  Right now, however, the judicial system exists at 
the local level, and is based on some secular law, Sharia law, or traditional Somali 
customary law.  Also, a fundamentalist Islamist government in Somalia is not going to be 
acceptable to the rest of the world.  Thus, Somalia needs a stable, democratic 
government, which, as history has shown, faces enormous difficulties in the country.  
Although the current Transitional Federal Government is not in power due to free and fair 
public elections, still retains some semblance of a democratic institution, as it is 
representative of Somali society and clans, and was originally “elected” in 2004.  In 
2009, President Sheikh Sharif Sheik Ahmed was elected by the Transitional Federal 
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Assembly in Djibouti, but neither he nor Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke 
has been able to do anything to stabilize the country. 
 Additionally, Somalia needs economic growth to off-set the benefits of piracy.  
Steady incomes and profitable, legitimate business will lead to an improvement in the 
quality of life, and make piracy and its risks less lucrative.  Obviously, a sustainable 
economy is a lofty goal, and one that goes hand in hand with internal security.  Basic 
economics mandates trade and investment to encourage growth.  Yet, overseas 
companies are going to be wary of investing in Somalia due to the unstable internal 
environment.  Thus, until the security and economic situations in Somalia improve, 
piracy is going to continue to harass shipping in the Western Indian Ocean. 
 In the meantime, a number of options are available for governments and shipping 
companies to pursue in their fight against piracy.  While none of these will bring about its 
demise, they can attempt to lessen its effects in the maritime community. These include 
ransom payments, on-board deterrents, diplomacy, littoral patrols and military action.  
Here each one will be discussed, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. 
 
Ransom Payments 
 Ransom payments are not a highly effective method of dealing with piracy.  A 
positive aspect of ransom payments is that they yield immediate results.  Once a 
negotiation is worked out, and the money delivered to the pirates, the ordeal is essentially 
over.  This method insures the safe return of the captured vessel and its cargo to the 
shipping company.  More importantly though, ransom payments guarantee the ship’s 
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crew is not harmed, and is safely handed over with the vessel and cargo once the payment 
has been made. 
 However there are risks associated with paying ransoms.  For one, it leaves 
vessels more prone to attack in the future.  As pirates are simply reaping the benefits of 
ransom payments, they are going to continue attacking vessels in the Gulf of Aden until 
the enterprise is no longer profitable.  Also, pirates have the upper hand during 
negotiations.  If a company is unable or unwilling to pay the desired amount, or deliver it 
in cash, it threatens the safety of the captured crew members.  While thus far the pirate 
groups have not been violent, there is no way to know whether or not they will start 
killing hostages in the future in order to show that they are dedicated and will be taken 
seriously. 
 As both the Barbary and Somali cases have illustrated, ransom payments do not 
solve the threat.  Rather, they exacerbate the problem.  In Barbary, treaties guaranteed the 
safe return of American captives, but at a major financial cost to the United States.  Also, 
it showed the Barbary leaders that the U.S. was weak and no real threat to their 
operations, which just encouraged further corsair raids.  The Somali case, while not 
exactly the same, has seen the same results.  It is true that ransom payments made by 
shipping companies assure the safe release of a ship, her crew, and cargo soon after the 
payment is received, but ransom payments also motivate the pirates to pursue future 






Best Safety Practices 
 The second option available is the use of best safety practices and on-board 
deterrents, which have had mixed results.  Proponents of increased on-board security 
measures claim they are good ways to ward off pirate attacks, and even simply increasing 
speed or removing the ladder on which pirates can board could thwart an assault.  The 
use of LRAD and ADS systems is a good way for any vessel, especially larger ships that 
cannot move quickly, to prevent pirates from getting close to the ship, and can give the 
crew time to prepare other defensive measures.  In an appearance before the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related 
Agencies, General David Petraeus urged merchant vessels traversing pirate infested 
waters to utilize more of these methods.  He noted that shipping companies need to 
increase their safety measures, possibly even hire armed security services, because a 
limited number of warships cannot protect thousands of vessels in the vast area off the 
coast of Somalia.203  While the naval patrols can be contacted in case of an emergency, 
the on-board deterrents are a first step, and one that is often effective.  Also, increasing 
the preventive measures may decrease the insurance costs of traveling through the Gulf 
of Aden, saving the shipping company money.  
 Yet, successful hijackings of ships still occur.  The problem with on-board 
deterrents is that eventually pirates are going to adapt to these techniques, and develop 
counter-measures that render the current tactics useless.  Also, they do not always work.  
What may work for one ship may fail completely for another, even if this second ship had 
properly implemented and executed the suggested techniques.  In addition, if pirates 
                                                           





attack under the cover of darkness, the crew may not know until it is too late.  Moreover, 
the small skiffs pirates use are much quicker than the majority of the commercial and 
recreational vessels that travel through the Gulf of Aden, so ships that do not have ample 
time (estimated to be fifteen minutes) to unscrew and pull up the ladders or get LRAD, 
ADS systems, or water cannons operational are unlikely to be able to foil the attack. 
 Best-safety practices and on-board deterrents have seen some success off the 
Horn of Africa, and did have some success against the Barbary corsairs as well.  During 
the Barbary era, a ship was able to fend off attack if its commander could outmaneuver 
the enemy craft, or if its crew was successfully able to defeat the attacking corsairs in 
combat.  The best example of this was Lt. Andrew Sterrett’s success on the USS 
Enterprize in 1801 when his leadership resulted in victory over the attacking Tripolitan 
cruiser Tripoli.  Vessels currently traversing the Gulf of Aden and waters off the Horn of 
Africa have also had success in fending off pirate attacks through the use of best-safety 
practices and on-board deterrents.  While not effective in every instance, vessels using a 
variety of deterrents, from the most high tech like LRADs and ADS to simply setting into 
a high-speed spin as one tugboat did, are able to fend off pirate attacks.  Practicing 
operational and communications security also denies the pirates information on location, 
on-board deterrents, routes and destinations, further protecting a ship from the highly 
sophisticated pirate networks. 
 
Diplomacy 
 A third option to pursue is diplomacy.  During the Barbary era, the Unites States 
was able to exercise its limited diplomatic power with the regencies and various 
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European powers.  Consuls worked diligently to negotiate protection arrangements and 
peace agreements.  They worked out tribute payments that provided for the release of 
captives upon receipt of the gifts, and also included annual payments that guaranteed 
safety for American ships as part the peace agreements.  Though they had only limited 
success, this worked in part because the Barbary States had a government the United 
States could work with.  These lessons can be applied to the Somali case, but will need to 
be done so in a different manner.  The Somali Transitional Federal Government has 
already made it clear that it is willing to work with outside powers to fight piracy off its 
shores.  It has reached out to the United Nations, pleading for help with the issue, as there 
is only so much it can do on its own.  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has pledged to 
establish a diplomatic team to work with officials from the TFG and regional leaders, 
especially those in Puntland.  The goal is for the combined efforts and power of the TFG 
and the United States to press local leaders into taking actions against the pirate 
organizations that operate in the territories that they control.  
 Working with the regional leaders likely means the TFG and the United States 
will have to work with local warlords and various clan leaders.  Though this is a scenario 
that many players would rather avoid, it has precedent and is not the worst option 
available.  During the George W. Bush administration, the warlords were tolerated and 
dealt with due to their participation in counter-terrorism measures in Somalia.  While 
working with the warlords to end piracy in Somalia would partially undermine the TFG, 
it could actually produce significant results.  However, as it is believed the warlords are 
profiting from piracy, they would need to be offered very large, attractive incentives to be 
willing to help end a profitable business.  There is also the possibility of working with 
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local clan leaders to help bring an end to piracy.  As this approach has seen some success 
in Afghanistan, another culture based largely on tribal ties, some thought should be given 
to trying it in Somalia.  While it is unclear who would execute such a policy, as bringing 
in foreign military personnel would likely not be effective, there is a chance that this 
strategy may work since Somalia is a society traditionally based on kinship. 
 The other faction that has any influence in Somalia is the Islamic Courts Union, 
and its militant wing, al-Shabaab.  As the United States has placed al-Shabaab on its 
terrorist watch list, claiming it has al-Qaeda ties and recruits foreign fighters (possibly 
even Somali-Americans204), working with the group will not happen.  Unfortunately, the 
ICU would be very beneficial to the fight against piracy, for two reasons.  First, the ICU 
has experience with the issue, and has both the knowledge and the willingness to bring an 
end to Somali piracy.  Second, like the clan leaders, the Islamists have an air of 
legitimacy to them, as they share a common factor (religion) with the overwhelming 
majority of the Somali population.  Until the ICU transforms from a Taliban-like 
organization to a moderate, democracy-oriented group, however, the United States, and 
much of the rest of the international community, is going to be unwilling to offer any 
support to this policy. 
  Another diplomatic option is one already being followed:  reaching out to the 
international community to help with counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.  In 
her statement, Secretary of State Clinton emphasized the need for the International 
                                                           





Contact Group on Somalia to “develop an expanded multinational response.”205  This 
includes the need for a single, comprehensive strategy on Somalia, so that guidelines for 
response can be developed, naval action coordinated, and a single message condemning 
piracy from a unified international voice be broadcasted. 
 Finally, Clinton’s remarks on the response to piracy highlighted a point already 
touched upon – the need for shipping and insurance companies to address self-defense 
measures, reasoning that combating piracy is the responsibility of both governments and 
the shipping industry.  The team tasked with engaging the TFG and regional Somali 
leaders has also been directed to work with shippers and the insurance industry to 
improve their defense mechanisms, including their on-board deterrents.  In addition, 
Clinton suggested tracking funds and pirate assets, a tactic that has already proven 
successful against terrorist organizations. 
 Diplomacy worked in the Barbary era, to an extent, because the United States had 
a strong government able of controlling the corsairs to negotiate with.  However, the 
connection diplomacy had with tribute payments, coupled with the fact that the U.S. had 
no military power to guarantee the enforcement of any peace agreements, meant 
diplomatic negotiations with the Barbary leaders were often futile.  In the case of the 
Somali pirates, diplomacy, while always the most preferred method of solving crises, will 
not affect the situation.  The lack of a strong, stable government that has law enforcement 
capabilities and a working judicial system means that, although the TFG is willing to 
cooperate with and indeed needs the help of the international community, it is powerless 
to do anything about the problem.  Thus, just negotiating with the government is not 
                                                           





enough; specific strategies and the means with which to achieve them are necessary for a 
successful campaign against piracy.   
 The fact that the Somali Transitional Federal Government is not seen as entirely 
legitimate (and thus not very well liked or supported by the Somali people), makes 
diplomatic solutions even more difficult.  Working with the people in power, rather than 
the government, can have serious consequences of its own.  First, there is no telling what 
level of backlash there will be from strengthening the warlords, clan leaders or Islamist 
factions.  While any one of them may put an end to piracy, they also have the potential to 
further weaken the government, and cause the country to slip even further into chaos.  
Additionally, it is unclear how these actions might play out in the international 
community.  Negotiating agreements with various groups runs the risk of undermining 
international operations and forcing other states to take decisive action for fear that the 
United States’ policy will threaten their own security.  Also, legitimizing any warlord, 
clan leader, or al-Shabaab has the future potential to further destabilize the region.  In 
addition, it is unknown whether or not piracy will be indeed be erased as a result of any 
agreements, as many leaders have personal, not necessarily security, interests at heart.  
Thus, even if they do stop Somali piracy, there is no guarantee that it will be permanent.  
In the future, they may sanction a return to piracy because they enjoyed the revenues, a 
portion of which they are likely now receiving. 
 
Littoral Patrols   
 Probably the most effective deterrent of piracy in the twenty-first century is the 
use of littoral patrols, which operate along the coasts in pirate infested waters.  These 
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patrols prove more beneficial than any option discussed thus far, and in the past few years 
have successfully reduced the number of pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca that were  
frequent in the earlier part of the twenty-first century.  In the Somali case, littoral patrols 
would serve as a deterrent and law enforcement capability, relieve navies from piracy 
patrols, and even address some of the grievances of the pirates and the Somali people.    
 First, littoral patrols are able to stay closer to shore, and scan both the water and 
land for activity.  Knowing where the pirate strongholds are located, the patrols have an 
advantage as they can specifically target these areas, keeping watch for suspicious vessels 
that have tell-tale signs of pirate boats (a certain number of men, travelling in groups of 
three, a lack of fishing equipment, or the presence of heavy weapons and ammunition).  If 
equipped with the proper surveillance technology, the personnel aboard have a better 
chance of knowing when and where pirate vessels are launching, and thus have a better 
chance of thwarting attacks.  These patrols, unlike the naval ones on the high seas, are 
made up of smaller, faster boats that have the ability to quickly engage suspect vessels.  
Their mission is to interdict suspicious boats in territorial waters before they can make it 
out to sea, or ones that are engaging in illicit activities.  If a law enforcement component 
is added as part of the patrol’s assignment, then it could act as even more of a deterrent, 
since the patrol would now have the ability to detain, arrest, and hand over pirates to the 
authorities able to prosecute them.  A law enforcement task could also help address the 
grievances of the Somali people, as well as the original purpose of the Somali “Coast 
Guard” pirate organizations.  The patrols could guard territorial waters from illegal 
foreign fishermen, as well as illegal, often toxic, dumping in Somali waters.  With the 
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waters free for the Somalis to safely and profitably fish in, there is a chance pirate attacks 
would decrease. 
 In addition, littoral patrols relieve the naval patrols operating on the high seas of 
the Western Indian Ocean, which are then able to return to their intended, traditional 
missions.  Initial patrols, however, would still be part of the U.S. Navy’s mission, as it is 
in the process of acquiring a new type of warship, the Littoral Combat Ship, which can be 
used to counter piracy off Somalia until an African program is developed.  As littoral 
patrols are normally conducted by the states surrounding the inflicted waters, it will 
eventually need to be the job of those countries to work together in building, coordinating 
and maintain patrols to combat piracy in the region, as Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore did around the Strait of Malacca.  Because these three states have experienced 
great success in executing a littoral patrol program in Southeast Asia it would be 
beneficial to have representatives from each country take the lead in developing an 
African plan.  As Somalia in its current state would be unable to undertake such a task, 
the international community, and African Union in particular, would need to help run 
such a program.   
The 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis caused by slumping currencies, a rise in 
debt, and devalued stock markets throughout Southeast Asia and Japan, and intensified 
by poor International Monetary Fund economic stabilization policies, hurt Malaysia’s 
economy and devastated that of Indonesia.  In Indonesia, this also severely affected the 
security of the government and the country, and provided ideal conditions for a growth in 
both piracy and terrorism in the islands.  Inability to prevent falling wages, higher food 
prices, job losses and funding for effective coastal monitoring added to the pull towards 
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piracy.  Due to their proximate location to the vital Strait of Malacca, pirates from 
Malaysia, and more so Indonesia, profited greatly during the first years of the twenty-first 
century.  As the Strait of Malacca is extremely narrow (with the narrowest point only 1.5 
miles wide), and see approximately 50,000 ships (or one-third of the world’s maritime 
shipping) pass through them each year, piracy flourished and became an enormous 
security threat in the region.  In 2004, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore increased 
patrols (done by both their navies and coast guards) to curb the rate of piracy in the 
region.  Since then, attacks in Southeast Asia have dropped from 94 in 2004 to 32, with 
only 15 in the South China Sea around the Strait of Malacca, Indonesia, and Singapore in 
2009. 
Unfortunately there are a number of issues with littoral patrols.  First, they are 
expensive to develop if a state (or states) lacks the equipment or capabilities of 
continuously conducting patrols over a long period of time.  The same is true for foreign 
states; operating warships, whether on littoral or high-seas patrols, is costly.  In addition, 
if the operations are multinational (as they would have to be at the onset), coordination 
and jurisdiction becomes an issue.  As Somalia has a long coastline, which state would be 
patrolling which areas and when, who would contribute resources and manpower versus 
who would contribute funds, and who has jurisdiction in Somali territorial waters to 
arrest and prosecute pirates would all need to be agreed upon before operations could 
commence.  
Further, the TFG would need to work with local leaders to make sure the Somali 
people understand why ships are located so close to their shores, and emphasize to the 
people that the patrol boats must be allowed to interdict the pirates; this is a daunting task 
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indeed.  Also, there will still be a need for a blue-water navy to help patrol the Gulf of 
Aden.  Pirates who are able to evade patrol boats or are already in international waters 
will still be able to carry out operations on the high seas, so the major navies will still 
need to remain in the area.  Thus, the patrols do little to help the major navies return to 
their traditional missions.  Finally, if the initial stages of such patrols are coordinated 
international actions, then there is little incentive for the TFG or African Union to 
become involved by contributing or developing a coast guard apparatus, as these patrols 
are already being carried out for them.   
 
Military Action 
 Finally, military action brings with it a lot of options the other methods lack, and 
also incorporates components of those alternatives.  Military endeavors involve 
coordination, sophisticated technology, intelligence, tactical competence, thorough 
strategies, and adherence to law.  For the United States, the Navy is more than capable of 
using its resources and abilities to combat piracy. 
 During the Barbary era the United States waged two successful wars against the 
Barbary regencies.  The strength and capabilities of the Navy contributed to campaigns 
that ended the relationship based on tribute and bribery the U.S. had with the Barbary 
States.  No longer were American ships traversing the Mediterranean Sea at risk of attack 
or capture by Barbary corsairs.  After the War with Algiers ended in 1816, U.S. 
commercial vessels were free to pursue trade in the region with threats now only coming 
from competing European powers.   
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 In concern to the current situation off the Horn of Africa, counter-piracy 
operations have had some successes.  Participation in rescue operations, and interdiction 
and detention missions has yielded positive results.  However, the hopes that a large 
naval presence in the region would deter most pirate attacks have yet to be fulfilled.  The 
following illustrate the capabilities of the United States Navy, how these may be applied 
to counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, and the weaknesses of naval action as 
well. 
 Currently, the United States is engaging in international action in the Gulf of 
Aden.  Because the Navy recognizes that no one state can police the world’s waters, it 
makes it the ideal organization (besides the fact that it is the only one that has the 
capabilities and knowledge to combat piracy) to participate in international coalitions, 
such as CTF-151, to take on this threat.  It has the ability to share responsibilities and 
information with other navies, and work with these other countries to develop specific 
counter-piracy strategies and tactics to be applied in the Gulf of Aden.  The Navy is 
increasingly participating in network centric operations, which deal with an integrated 
force network that facilitates efficient, easy information sharing in order to increase 
situational awareness and ensure knowledge of the commander’s overall intent in battle.  
The goal is to translate “information advantage into combat power by effectively linking 
friendly forces within the battlespace, providing a much improved shared awareness of 
the situation, enabling more rapid and effective decision making at all levels of military 
operations, and thereby allowing for increased speed of execution.”206  Currently, the 
Navy is in the process of developing and applying FORCEnet, the future implementation 
                                                           





device of network centric warfare.  It is the “operational construct and architectural 
framework for Naval Warfare in the Information Age to integrate warriors, sensors, 
networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons.”207  Through network centric 
operations, intelligence will be more easily distributed; at sea this means transmitting 
information concerning piracy, terrorism, enemy naval vessels, or any other threat to a 
unified fleet dispersed over a large area.   
 In terms of information and intelligence, the U.S. Navy has a wealth of excellent 
resources at its disposal.  Due to increased intelligence sharing requirements after 9/11, 
the Navy should be receiving pertinent intelligence from other agencies and branches of 
the military in relation to its task.  It also has its own incredibly sophisticated intelligence 
collection capabilities and department of analysts.  The Navy’s C4ISR technology is 
some of the most advanced in the world, and includes a number of unmanned vehicles 
(aerial, surface, ground and underwater).  In addition, the imagery intelligence (IMINT) 
and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities of the Navy can be utilized to combat 
piracy.  Photographs taken by satellites, navy planes, and UAVs, such as the ScanEagle 
and Pioneer, can be used to identify locations and track movements.  IMINT can illustrate 
what ports pirates operate in and out of, frequently used routes, shipment of armaments to 
the pirates, and can track the movement of pirate ships in open water.  For example, small 
tactical un-manned air systems (STUAS), and satellite imagery can provide a clear 
illustration of the situations within the pirate – plagued Gulf of Aden.  The main issue 
                                                           





with using satellites though is that if pirates use fishing vessels, then the satellites are 
unable to distinguish between pirates and commercial fishermen.208 
   SIGINT critical node enablers, such as wireless network technologies, can aid in 
counter-piracy efforts by intercepting messages that relay intent, dates, patterns and 
plans.  Theoretically, telemetry and electronic intelligence that can pick up on weapons 
emissions and systems209, if used, and can gauge the capabilities of weapons used, thus 
giving the U.S. and CTF-151 members an idea of the strength and threat of a particular 
pirate vessel.  With this knowledge Navy commanders issue alerts warning of the dangers 
in littoral areas during a given time period in hopes of avoiding attacks or the taking of a 
ship.   
 In addition to the intelligence capabilities, naval craft have a technical advantage 
over pirate vessels.  With the most up-to-date sophisticated weaponry, the Navy can 
counter almost every man-made threat.  Included in its arsenal are radar and short range 
tactical -, intermediate range tactical-, and surveillance sonar systems, the Aegis combat 
system, target acquisition systems, guided weapons systems, missiles (including anti-
ship, surface-to-air, and cruise) and missile launchers, torpedoes, 5 and 16 inch guns with 
corresponding 38, 50 or 54 caliber munitions, and various helicopters and naval aircraft.  
Clearly, the Navy is ready for battle against another powerful fleet, and thus can easily 
overpower pirate boats if they wished.  Also, the U.S. Navy has an elite submarine fleet 
at its disposal, which, if integrated with surface missions, and provided timely, accurate 
information, can be highly effective against asymmetric threats that cannot detect its 
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presence.  Submarines are stealthy, agile, and require minimal logistic support, making 
them ideally suited to carry out operations and survive in hostile, “forward-deployed 
areas across the spectrum of peace and conflict.”210  Their mission agility and technical 
capabilities to identify and avoid the enemy make submarines ideal for long – term 
operations.   A submarine’s ability “to penetrate and operate in denied areas with virtual 
impunity while detecting and destroying advanced threats will be a critical enabler to 
ensure our Navy can fight and win in the littorals.”211  
Littoral capabilities are an excellent counter-piracy tool.  Development of a LCS 
fleet by the U.S. Navy will allow it to stop and interdict pirates before they can get out to 
sea.  An effective, extensive international littoral force is a deterrent that will have a 
positive impact on the safety of ships traversing the Gulf of Aden, and one that will 
attack the symptoms of piracy.  To understand the importance of securing the littorals in 
combat zones, the United States must look to its experience in Vietnam just prior to the 
Tet Offensive.  During the Vietnam Conflict, the United States Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, 
and South Vietnamese Navy, though operating patrols in busy commercial waterways, 
were unable to detect the transfer of arms and munitions to the Viet Cong before the Tet 
Offensive until it was too late.  While a new surveillance plan was enacted in March 1965 
that employed aircraft and radar to identify fishing trawlers transporting war materials, 
and required the U.S. Coast Guard monitor coasts and in-shore waterways, the damage 
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had been done, despite these efforts being successful in deterring further transport of 
arms. 
Finally, the new United Nations legal measures, in addition to United States laws 
governing response to piracy, give the Navy leeway to pursue, detain and prosecute 
pirates in a legitimate manner.  As the United States is willing and able to prosecute and 
punish pirates, the U.S. Navy, unlike those of other states, can be a major deterrent to 
pirates.  If more and more are detained (rather than killed), and not returned to Somalia 
(as some European countries are forced to do with captured pirates), pirate organizations 
may eventually begin to realize that there are increased risks to their actions, and thus 
abandon their pursuits.  In addition, capture of pirates also means capture of vessels and 
arms, forcing pirate groups to spend more money acquiring new capabilities. 
Despite the number of advantages of using naval power to combat piracy in the 
Gulf of Aden, there are also a number of shortcomings to this strategy, as well as a 
plethora of challenges.  First of all, the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean off the 
coast of Somali spans a wide expanse of ocean, with a coastline that is approximately 
1900 miles long.  Thus, with only a limited amount of ships available to patrol the area 
(approximate 36 in the CTF-151), vessels are still vulnerable as the naval contingent 
cannot be everywhere at once, leaving vast areas susceptible to attacks. 
In addition, even when naval ships are in the area, it can be difficult to 
differentiate between regular fishing boats and pirate vessels.  As pirate organizations 
operate from motherships, which are often captured large fishing trawlers, surveillance 
capabilities may not be able to identify the vessel as an actual pirate boat.  In such a 
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scenario, pirates may be free from detection and able to carry out operations once they 
are far enough out of range of the navy ship. 
When navy ships are in range, however, they still face problems interdicting 
pirates and thwarting attacks.  Unlike the swift boats the pirate organizations utilize, 
battleships and destroyers are big and bulky, and thus move at a much slower speed.  
Even if they are in the area, there is still a chance that pirates will hijack a ship between 
the time a distress call is issued and the time the warship arrives.  In addition, though the 
United Nations has given permission to states to chase pirate vessels into Somali 
territorial waters, the navy ships must be careful in doing so.  The ships are made for 
blue-water operations far out to sea, not green-water maneuvers close to the coast.  Thus, 
the vessels need to be careful not to run aground, like the USS Philadelphia did 
immediately before her capture outside of Tripoli in 1803, which was a disaster then, and 
would certainly be a major disaster now. 
Littoral combat capabilities are much better suited for asymmetrical operations 
than traditional warships are.  Yet as of right now, the LCS system is not fully developed, 
and it is unclear if it would have any effect on Somali piracy.  More than two ships, 
which are all that is available at present, would certainly be needed; it will be some time 
before the full fleet of Littoral Combat Ships is developed, and when it is, there will still 
only be four.  In April 2009 Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that the DoD would 
increase the acquisition of new Littoral Combat Ships from two to three in fiscal year 
2010, with the eventual goal of a fleet of fifty-five ships.  If these are to police littoral 
regions worldwide, the Navy will certainly need more the present two, as the Somali 
coast and Gulf of Aden alone would need multiple vessels.  There is no doubt that littoral 
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patrols would help, as the Malaccan case illustrated.  Yet, part of the reason why those 
endeavors were successful is due to the small size of the Strait of Malacca.  As the 
waterway is narrow and not very long, it is much easier for the littoral states to police.  
Also, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore all had both the willingness and resources to 
build a large enough monitoring capability to effectively patrol the coasts.  Somalia, 
whose coasts are much longer and whose government does not have the funds to build up 
a coastal taskforce capable of patrolling and securing the littoral areas, is unable to 
contribute to an international, or even U.S. effort to monitor the Somali coast and its 
territorial waters. 
Also, it is unclear whether or not countering piracy is part of the Navy’s mission, 
and if it is not, whether or not it should be in the future.  As piracy is not a traditional task 
of the Navy, and, unlike terrorism, is not a direct threat to the United States, many make 
the case that it should not be the role of the U.S. Navy to engage in counter-piracy 
activities.  Rather, it is believed that piracy is a law enforcement problem, and therefore 
requires a law enforcement solution.  This would mean employing a coast guard, not a 
traditional navy, to deal with the issue, as navies do not have law enforcement 
capabilities or jurisdiction in foreign territorial or international waters, despite the recent 
U.N. Resolutions. 
In addition, if the Navy is tasked with taking on piracy as a new part of its 
mission, there is a strong likelihood that the U.S. Navy will have a presence in the region 
for long time to come.  Not only does this distract it from pressing transnational threats, 
but it is also very expensive to maintain and operate warships for years on end.  The same 
case can be made for the LCS system.  If deployed to the region, it will remain engaged 
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until piracy can be effectively quelled, which could take years, and thus make it a rather 
expensive operation. 
As piracy is an asymmetric, non-traditional threat, the Navy could attempt 
implementing counterinsurgency tactics, like the Army and Marine Corps have done in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, to help suppress Somali piracy.  A major tenet of this requires the 
Navy to win the “hearts and minds” of the Somali people in order to effectively carry out 
operations.  Unfortunately, this is much easier said than done, for a few reasons.  First, 
the Somali people, after experiencing massive Western and U.S. intervention (including 
the arms sales to Siad Barre in the 1970s, and the UNOSOM and UNITAF incursions in 
the 1990s), are wary and distrustful of Western powers.  Second, navies are far out to sea 
while Somali citizens are on land, preventing the necessary interaction between the two 
groups.  Unless sailors dare step foot off the ships, which in a place like Somalia, even 
with automatic weapons and Kevlar body armor, it is incredibly dangerous to do so, not 
much can come from this approach. 
A major issue with the use of naval force to combat Somali piracy is the fact that 
it has been in use since late 2008, and thus far is not having much of an effect.  Pirates are 
not intimidated or afraid of warships, and thus the strategy is not working as a deterrent.  
The lack of available options for navies in concern to how to halt attacks, conduct 
hostage rescue missions, and implement detention, prosecution, and punishment 
capabilities is allowing the pirates to continue their operations un-phased, as they know 
there are no serious consequences to their actions.  If a law enforcement capability, such 
as a coast guard or Interpol was working with the naval powers, it might have more of an 
effect than current tactics are.  Also, rules of warfare, dictated by just war theory and 
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outlined in the Geneva Conventions, give guidance about the amount of firepower that 
can be used against an adversary.  The proportionality clause prevents the use of 
overwhelming force that would obliterate the enemy giving him no ability to defend 
himself, no matter what the cause of the conflict.  For the United States Navy, this is a 
major issue in concern to piracy because the equipment of the pirates, while advanced, is 
still no match for the sophisticated weaponry available on board a warship.  Response in 
the form of a torpedo, missile, or large caliber gun would likely be seen as overkill in the 
eyes of most of the world, could easily garner hatred towards the United States by the 
Somali people, and possibly recruit more pirates, or worse, terrorists to Islamic 
fundamentalist organizations in other parts of the world. 
Finally, naval force does not address the root causes of Somali piracy.  It does not 
solve the problem on shore, and at best can only curb its symptoms at sea.  Neither naval 
force, nor a military incursion into Somalia, are able to secure political stability, boost the 
economy, or improve humanitarian conditions.  For now, all the various navies patrolling 
the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean can do is hope to be near the right place at 











 As the cases of naval interaction with the Barbary corsairs of the nineteenth 
century and the Somali pirates of the twenty-first century have shown, the United States 
Navy has had mixed results dealing with piracy throughout its history.  The 
circumstances of the conflicts and the capabilities of the Navy have determined the role 
of military action in the solution.  In both cases it was not the first resort, and has, and 
should continue to be, applied in combination with other courses of action.  The results of 
the Barbary and Somali cases illustrate the successes and failures of the various methods 
for combating piracy, and highlight why naval action is currently the most viable option. 
 In both Barbary and Somalia, the first resort has been to agree to ransom 
demands.  However, as Menkhaus explained, ransom payments are dangerous because 
they allow piracy to become entrenched in society.212  This was certainly the case during 
the Barbary era, when pirate revenues benefited not only the corsairs and the Barbary 
leaders, but the regencies’ economies as well.  In Somalia, the situation is becoming 
perilously close to paralleling the role of piracy in Barbary society.  As Boot pointed out, 
piracy is a lucrative industry that has taken in revenues of over 100 million USD in recent 
years.213  The problem is spinning out of control not only on the seas, but on Somali soil 
as well, where these massive revenues are finding their way into the hands of Somali 
officials and wealthy businessmen, and are resulting in economic growth in pirate towns 
along the Somali coast.  While this last point is certainly a positive aspect, it comes at the 
cost of pirate networks becoming heavily entrenched in Somali society.  Pham explains 
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that these hefty ransom payments are a cause for the continuation of piracy.214  The 
Barbary case illustrated this, showing that while tribute payments were successful in 
freeing captured mariners, they also provided incentive for the Barbary leaders to 
sanction future corsair raids.  In Somalia, the ransom payments made by shipping 
companies have had the same effect.  Although they do guarantee the safe release of 
vessel, crew, and cargo, they too entice pirates to conduct further attacks. 
 Diplomacy was an important component to the United States approach to 
Barbary.  Closely linked to tribute payments, this strategy encountered systemic failure in 
part due to the inability of the U.S. to produce the agreed upon tribute payments on-time, 
as well as its lack of power to reinforce negotiations.  The Barbary leaders’ practice of 
disregarding negotiated peace agreements on a whim also contributed to the failure of 
diplomacy.  In Somalia, diplomacy is not a true option for solving the conflict because 
Somalia lacks a strong government.  Despite the United States policy to engage TFG 
officials and Puntland leaders and press them to take actions against pirates215, diplomacy 
is essential futile.  Although the Somali government has asked for help solving the piracy 
crisis, the best the U.S. can do is work with other countries to form a possible solution 
that is satisfactory to the Somali TFG.  A stronger central government in Somalia is what 
is needed to end piracy.  Only a government that has effective law enforcement 
institutions, a sound judicial system and the capability to stop piracy on shore will bring 
about the demise of Somali piracy.216 
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 Some success in staving off pirate attacks has been achieved through the use of 
best-safety practices and on-board deterrents.  In the Barbary era this was uncommon, 
with victory over the corsairs on the seas coming only if the two ships were of relatively 
equal size and power, and if a vessel’s mariners and leaders were well enough versed in 
combat and evasive maneuvering to overcome her foe.  The best example was the defeat 
of the Tripoli by the USS Enterprize under the direction of Lt. Andrew Sterrett.   
New technologies and practices that have been developed and implemented in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have been successful in thwarting attacks 
from Somali pirates.  While hijackings still occur, preventive measures and on-board 
deterrents have bolstered the safety of commercial vessels traversing the waters around 
the Horn of Africa, and show promise for the future.  Lennox explains that commercial 
ships can practice operational and communications security to avoid pirates from gaining 
knowledge of their on-board deterrents, location, route, number of crew on board, and 
final destination, as well as implement evasive maneuvering to outrun or avoid pirate 
skiffs.217 Additionally, on-board capabilities such as fire hoses and Long Range Acoustic 
Devices have been successfully utilized to thwart potential pirate attacks in the region.  
Patch points to the 2005 case of the U.S.-flagged Seabourn Spirit, whose captain 
implemented safety actions, including speeding out to open waters and deploying the 
ship’s LRAD after coming under attack from a pirate vessel.218 
 In terms of military action, naval power was successful in the Barbary case 
because the regencies’ fleets could rival that of the fledgling United States.  The deys and 
beys of the Barbary States understood and reacted to a show of force.  In addition, they 
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were willing and able to engage in diplomacy to work out peace agreements with the 
United States.  These leaders had control over their citizens, regulated corsair activity in 
and out of the regency, and operated similarly to the Europeans, using their corsair fleets 
in a traditional manner.  Thus, the United States understood that a strong and 
overwhelming show of force would convince the leaders of the Barbary regencies to 
cease attacks against United States commercial vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.  The 
wars with Tripoli and Algiers, in 1801 and 1815 respectively, effectively ended corsair 
raids against U.S. ships traversing the area. 
 In contrast to the success of the Barbary era, the United States Navy is 
experiencing only limited victories over the Somali pirates.  The overall end of piracy in 
Somalia will come as a result of a stable government and effective law enforcement 
capabilities. While the Navy will not be able to solve this issue on land, it can conduct 
interdiction missions and apprehend suspected pirates at sea219, as well as participate in 
blockades, hostage rescue, search and rescue, and deterrence operations.220   
As the threat has changed from the Barbary era though, transforming from a 
traditional maritime foe into an asymmetric adversary in the last two hundred years, so 
too must the Navy adapt from combating regional powers to relatively small 
organizations.  However, the traditional nature of the Navy is making it difficult to do so.  
The lack of littoral capabilities deployed in the world, especially in pirate-infested waters, 
forces the Navy to rely on its warships, which in turn are unable to counter the threat 
along the coast.  Patch emphasizes this point, pointing out that warships are ill-equipped 
to combat piracy, and that the threat should be left to law enforcement agencies.  He 
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claims that if the Navy is to be involved, it should be in a supporting role with law 
enforcement detachments placed aboard ships to deal with piracy.221   
The reliance on traditional warships has kept the U.S. Navy far out to sea, hoping 
to be in the vicinity of a ship when a distress call is issued.  This fact has led many to 
conclude that the deterrence patrols have been widely unsuccessful so far.  Kraska and 
Wilson agree with this point, stating that the patrols have not been conducted properly, 
and need to be structured so that the major naval powers are supporting the regional 
navies in order for naval operations to be successful.  In addition, they argue for an 
International Maritime Operational Threat Response program that will facilitate 
communications between the maritime states patrolling the region, as fostering 
international cooperation is the key to military success.222  Fortunately, there have been 
victories.  The successful hostage rescue of Captain Richard Phillips in April 2009 by 
three U.S. Navy SEALS illustrates that the United States is not afraid to use its force 
against the pirates, and that, despite the difficulties it faces, the Navy is still able to 
counter asymmetric threats while keeping its traditional nature.     
 While this represents only a limited success, it is important to keep in mind that 
the Navy, along with others in Combined Task Force 151, and still other major navies 
patrolling the Gulf of Aden, is operating in a vast region that cannot be completely 
monitored at all the times.  However, if the Navy were to utilize more of its assets, then 
counter-piracy operations in the region would likely be much more successful, and 
attacks possibly thwarted more frequently.  Axe points to the use of unmanned aerial 
drones such as the ScanEagle that are being used to seek out pirates both at sea and on 
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land as one such example of how the Navy’s various capabilities can be utilized in the 
fight against piracy.223  Also, the military solution is a more effective and viable option 
than others being considered.  Ransom payments, on-board deterrents, diplomacy, and 
littoral patrols, while all viable options, do not produce the desired outcomes.  And while 
the Navy is encountering this same problem, it is working diligently with international 
partners under authorization of the United Nations to implement robust action that 
interdicts and thwarts pirate attacks.  Unlike ransom payments, naval action discourages 
piracy, and is more effective than diplomacy with a government that has no real power, 
on-board deterrents that work for some vessels and not others, and littoral patrols that do 
not exist off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. 
 It is important to remember that with this show of force, the United States must 
exercise some of it soft power to win in Somalia.  This soft power has already been 
beneficial to the United States, as it has gotten other states to participate in counter-piracy 
patrols in the region.  It would be wonderful if soft power resources could be utilized to 
implement courses of action that actually fixed the root causes of piracy in Somalia, but 
that is just not possible.  The true end of Somali piracy is a stable government capable of 
instilling security throughout the country, and a growing economy that gives the Somali 
people legitimate industries in which to work.  Obviously, the United States is not 
capable of solving this issue through military action, if at all.  Until peace and prosperity 
can somehow be brought to Somalia piracy will run rampant, and the best option the 
United States has to combat this threat is utilizing its military power as a deterrent. 
 
 
                                                           





Associated Press.  “Navy Ponders, What to do With Pirates?”  18 April 2009 
http://www.military.com/news/article/navy-ponders-what-to-do-with-pirates  
(accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
Axe, David.  “4 Fronts for Pirate-Navy Battles as Pirate Attacks Continue.” 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_law/4285201.html  
(accessed 17 April 2009). 
 
Bluff, Joe.  “Mullahs vs. Pirates:  Solution, or New Problems?”   
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/004840.html  (accessed 14 May 2009). 
 
Boot, Max.  “Pirates Then and Now:  How Piracy Was Defeated in the Past and Can be 
 Again.”  Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (July-August 2009). 
 
Brulliard, Karin.  “U.S. Outreach On Rough Seas Off Western Africa.”  The Washington 
Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/20/  
(accessed 20 May 2009). 
 
Bruton, Bronwyn.  “Self Induced Stalemate in Somalia:  An Assessment of U.S. Policy 
Options.”  Center for Strategic and International Studies http://www.csis.org  
(accessed 3 June 2009). 
 
Central Intelligence Agency.  World Factbook.   
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html.  
(accessed 28 March 2009). 
 
Chalk, Peter.  “The Maritime Dimension of International Security:  Terrorism, Piracy, 
 and Challenges for the United States.”  RA'D Corporation, 2008.   
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf 
 
Clayton, Jonathan.  “Business Booms in Somalian Pirate Village Eyl.” The Australian,  
19 November 2008. 
 
CNN.  “3 ‘Phenomenal Shots’ Ended Pirate Hostage Crisis.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/13/somalia.rescue.breakdown/index
.html  (accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
CNN.  “6 Dead in Somali Parliament Mortar Attack.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/25/somalia.attack/index.html  
(accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Dozens of Civilians Killed in Latest Somalia Fighting.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/05/23/somalia.fighting/index.html  




CNN.  “French Navy Seizes 11 Suspected Pirates.”  
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/15/pirates.captured/index.html  
(accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Is Obama Serious About War on Piracy?”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/17/pm.pirates/index.html  (accessed  
28 April 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Italian Cruise Ship Thwarts Pirate Attack.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/26/somalia.pirates/index.html  
(accessed 28 April 2009).   
 
CNN.  “Japan Destroyers Set Sail on Anti-Piracy Mission.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/03/14/japan.pirates/index.html  
(accessed 31 March 2009). 
 
CNN.  “More Than $200M Pledged to Beat Somali Pirates.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/24/pirates.security.meeting.money/i
ndex.html  (accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
CNN.  “New Pirate Attack Thwarted in Gulf of Aden.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/19/pirate.attack.foiled/index.html  
(accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Petraeus Tells Shipping Companies to ‘Get More Serious’ About Piracy.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/24/petraeus.pirates/index.html  
(accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Pirates’ Former Hostage Favors More Government Protection.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/30/piracy.testimony/index.html  
(accessed 14 May 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Pirates Free Ship and Crew Held for 5 Months.”   
http://ww.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/21/somalia.pirates.ship.released/inde
x.html  (accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Pirates Hijack German-owned Ship.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/05/06/piracy.german.ship/index.html  
(accessed 14 May 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Pirates Hijack UK-owned Ship in Indian Ocean.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/05/02/seychelles.piracy/index.html  





CNN.  “Pirates Seized After Threatening French Navy Ship.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/05/03/kenya.pirates/index.html  
(accessed 14 May 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Pirates Vow to Kill U.S., French Sailors.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/13/somalia.pirates.revenge/index.ht
ml  (accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Report:  Russia Detains 29 Suspected Pirates.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/04/29/russia.detains.pirates/index.html 
(accessed 5 May 2009). 
 
CNN.  “ ‘Robust Action’ Could Curtail Piracy, Expert Says.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/15/pirates.action/index.html  (accessed 
28 April 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Ship’s Cook Seized by Pirates Blames Employers.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/27/lawsuit.maersk.pirates/index.html  
(accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Somalia Confirmed as Piracy Capital.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/01/16/pirates.year/index.html  
(accessed 31 March 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Somali-American’s Family:  Who Sent Son to Die?”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/07/13/somalia.american.killed/index.ht
ml.  (accessed 13 July 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Somali PM:  Anti-Pirate patrols Not Working.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/23/pirates.security.meeting/index.ht
ml (accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Somali President Calls for Help in Battling Islamist Militias.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/05/25/somalia.president/index.html  
(accessed 29 May 2009). 
 
CNN.  “Suspect in Ship Hijacking Charged With Piracy.”   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/21/alleged.pirate.new.york.index.html.  
(accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
Crenshaw, Martha.  “The Causes of Terrorism.”  Comparative Politics 13, no. 4  
(July 1981):  379-399. 
 
Cronin, Audrey Kurth.  “Behind the Curve:  Globalization and International Terrorism.” 





De Pontet, Philippe.  “Obama Navigates Somalia’s Troubled Waters.”  Foreign Policy: 
 The Call (April 2009),  
http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/15/obama_navigates_somalias_tro
ubled_waters  (accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
Dickinson, Elizabeth.  “America’s High-Tech War on Pirates.”  Foreign Policy: 
Passport (February 2009), 
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/23/hunting_somali_pirates_yankee_s
tyle (accessed 3 May 2009). 
 
Eaglespeak.  “Combined Maritime Forces Counter-Pirate Force CTF-151.” 
http://www.eaglespeak.us/2009/01/combined-maritime-forces-counter-pirate.html  
(accessed 22 May 2009). 
 
The Economist.  “Ahoy There Somalia” (November 2008)  
 http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa  (accessed 26 April 2009). 
 
Federation of American Scientists.  “Navy and Naval Equipment Tutorials.” 
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/miltutorials/naval.html  (accessed 14 June 
2009). 
 
Feste, Karen A. Intervention:  Shaping the Global Order.  Connecticut:  Praeger, 2003. 
 
Fisher, Jonah.  “Somali Pirate Patrol:  Day Five.” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7906849.stm  (accessed 17 May 2009). 
 
Fox News.  “For Somalis, Piracy Road to Power, Prosperity.”  8 April 2009 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,513381,00.html  (accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
Freeman, Colin.  “Islamic Fighters Enter Somalia Pirate Town and Plan to Attack.” 
Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/3501024  
(accessed 17 April 2009). 
 
Gallagher, Charles F.  The United States and 'orth Africa:  Morocco, Algeria, and 
 Tunisia.  Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 1963. 
 
Gettleman, Jeffrey.  “Lessons From the Barbary Pirate Wars.”  The 'ew York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/weekinreview/12/gettleman.html  (accessed 
26 April 2009). 
 
________.  “The Pirates Have Seized the Ship.”  GQ (February 2009) 






________.  “Q&A With a Pirate:  ‘We Just Want the Money’.”  The 'ew York Times  
30 September 2008,  http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/q-a-with-a-
pirate-we-just-want-the-money/  (accessed 26 April 2009). 
 
Goldberg, Jonah.  “How to Solve the Pirate Problem.”  Los Angeles Times 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-goldberg14-
2009apr14,0,1560384.colum  (accessed 28 April 2009). 
 
Grant, Greg.  “The Ungoverned Space Moves Out to Sea; Clinton Outlines Response.” 
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/04/15/the-ungoverned-space-moves-to-sea-
clinton-outlines-us-piracy-response/  (accessed 17 May 2009). 
 
Hanson, Stephanie.  “Backgrounder:  Combating Maritime Piracy.”  The 'ew York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/crf/world/slot1 (accessed 26 April 2009). 
 
Hanson, Stephanie.  “The United States Should Avoid ‘Grand Schemes’ in Somalia.” 
Interview with Bronwyn E. Bruton.  Council on Foreign Relations, 14 April 
2009, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19106/united_states_should_avoid_grand_scheme
s_in_somalia.html (accessed 26 April 2009). 
 
Hoffman, Bruce.  “Testimony:  Does Our Counter-Terrorism Strategy Match the 
Threat?”  RA'D Corporation, 2005.  
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT250-1/ (accessed 12 December 2009). 
 
ICC Commercial Crime Services. “Piracy Alert.” 
http://www.icccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view   (accessed 3 June 
2009). 
 
ICC Commercial Crime Services. “Pirate Attacks Almost Doubled in 2009 First Quarter” 
http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id:piracy-
attacks-almost-doubled-in-2009-first-quarter&catid=60:news&Itemid=51  
(accessed 3 June 2009). 
 
ICC Commercial Crime Services.  “Pirate Attacks Off Somalia Already Surpass 2008 
 Figures.”   
http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=352:pir
ate-attacks-off-somalia-already-surpass-2008-figures&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 
(accessed 3 June 2009). 
 
ICC Commercial Crime Services – International Maritime Bureau.  “Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships:  Annual Report 1 January-31December 2008.” (January 
2009). 
 
International Maritime Organization. “Piracy and Armed Robber Against Ships.” 




Karraker, Cyrus H.  Piracy Was a Business.  New Hampshire:  Richard R. Smith  
Publishers, Inc, 1953.  
 
Kraska, James and Brian Wilson.  “Fighting Piracy:  International Coordination is Key to 
Countering Modern-day Freebooters.”  Armed Forces Journal (February 2009) 
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/02/3928962 (accessed 24 March 2009). 
 
________.  “Fighting Pirates:  The Pen and the Sword.” World Policy Journal 25, no. 4  
(Winter 2008/09):  41-52. 
 
________.  “Maritime Piracy in East Africa.”  Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 2 
(Spring/Summer 2009):  55-68. 
 
Lambert, Frank.  The Barbary Wars.  New York:  Hill and Wang, 2005. 
Langewiesche, William.  “The Pirate Latitudes.”  Vanity Fair April 2009, 150-153, cont.  
181-187. 
 
Lennox, Patrick.  “Contemporary Piracy off the Horn of Africa.”  Canadian Defence & 
Foreign Affairs Institute (December 2008) 
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Contemporary%20Piracy%20off%20the%20Horn%20
of%20Africa.pdf  (accessed 24 March 2009). 
 
Lesser, Ian O.  “Countering the New Terrorism:  Implications for Strategy” in Countering 
 the 'ew Terrorism.  California:  RAND Corporation, 1999. 
 
Lewis, Ioan M.  Understanding Somalia and Somaliland:  Culture, History, Society. 
 New York:  Columbia University Press, 2008. 
 
Little, Peter D.  Somalia:  Economy Without State.  Indiana:  Indiana University Press, 
 2003. 
 
London, Joshua E.  Victory in Tripoli:  How America’s War with the Barbary Pirates  
 Established the U.S. 'avy and Shaped a 'ation.  New Jersey:  Wiley and Sons, 
Inc., 2005. 
 
Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence From Secrets to Policy, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.:  CQ 
Press, 2003. 
 
Lunsford, Virginia.  “What Makes Piracy Work?”  Proceedings, Vol. 134, no. 12 
(December 2008) 
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proccedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1693  






Lyons, Terrence and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia:  State Collapse, Multilateral 
Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction. Washington, D.C.:  The 
Brookings Institute., 1995. 
 
McNeill, Jena Baker and Brett D. Schaefer.  “Options for Combating Piracy in Somalia.”  
 Heritage Foundation WebMemo 'o. 2397 (15 April 2009). 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/wm2397.cfm 
 
Menkhaus, Ken.  “Dangerous Waters” Survival 51, no. 1 (2009):  21-25. 
 
________.  “The Seven Ways to Stop Piracy.”  Foreign Policy (April 2009:  Web 
Exclusive),  http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4872   
(accessed 4 May 2009). 
 
Middelton, Roger.  “Piracy in Somalia:  Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars.”  
Chatham House October 2008 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/665/  (accessed 24 
March 2009). 
 
Military.com.  “Navy Destroyer Battles Pirates.” 31 October 2007 
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,155177,00.html  (accessed 14 
May 2009). 
 
Mitchell, David.  Pirates.  New York:  The Dial Press, 1976. 
 
Mubarak, Jamil Abdalla.  From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia:  How an Economy Fell 
 Apart. Connecticut:  Praeger, 1996. 
 
Murphy, Martin N.  “Suppression of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism:  a Suitable Role for 
A Navy?”  'aval War College Review 60, no.3 (Summer 2007):  22-45. 
 
NavWeapons.com  “Naval Weapons of the World:  From 1880 to Today.” 
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/index_weapons.htm  (accessed 8 June 2009). 
 
Newman, Edward.  “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism.”  Studies in Conflict and 
 Terrorism 29, no. 8:  749-772. 
 
Nickerson, Jane Soames.  A Short History of 'orth Africa: From Pre-Roman Times to the 
Present. New York:  The Devin-Adair Company, 1961. 
 
Nye Jr., Joseph S.  Soft Power:  The Means to Success in World Politics.  New York:  
Public Affairs, 2004. 
 
Parker, Richard B.  Uncle Sam in Barbary:  A Diplomatic History.  Florida:  University 




Patch, John.  “The Overstated Threat.”  Proceedings 134, no. 12 (December 2008),  
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1694  
(accessed 4 May 2009). 
 
Pham, J. Peter.  “The Pirate Economy.”  Foreign Policy (April 2009:  Web Exclusive),  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4817  (accessed 4 May 
2009). 
 
Ploch, Lauren and others.  “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.”  Congressional Research 
 Service (21 April 2009). 
 
Lane-Poole, Stanley.  The Story of the Barbary Corsairs.  New York:  G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1890. 
 
Reveron, Derek S.  “Think Again:  Pirates.”  Foreign Policy (January 2009:  Web 
Exclusive),  http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4626  
(accessed 4 May 2009). 
 
Sedgwick, Mark.  “Inspiration and the Origins of the Global Waves of Terrorism.” 
  Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 2:  97-112. 
 
Shay, Shaul.  Somalia between Jihad and Restoration.  New Jersey:  Transaction 
Publishers, 2008. 
 
Snoddon, Robert. International Maritime Bureau definition of piracy in “Piracy and 
Maritime Terrorism:    Naval Responses to Existing and Emerging Threats to the 
Global Seaborne Economy.”, War and Game, 18 January 2008 
http://warandgame.wordpress.com/2008/01/18/  (accessed 26 February 2009). 
 
Stevenson, Jonathan.  “The U.S. Navy:  into Africa.”  'aval War College Review 62, no. 
1 (Winter 2009):  59-67 
 
Strategic Comments.  “Combating Piracy Off Somalia.”  Strategic Comments 15, no. 1 
 (2009):  1-2. 
 
Tucker, Jonathan B.  “Strategies for Countering Terrorism:  Lessons from the Israeli 
Experience.”  March 2003.  
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/tucker-israel.html  (accessed 12 
December 2009). 
 
United Nations.  “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 






United Nations Security Council.  “Resolution 1816 (2008).” 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/361/77/PDF/N0836177.pdf?Ope
nElement   (accessed 8 June 2009). 
 
United Nations Security Council.  “Resolution 1838 (2008).” 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/538/84/PDF/N0853884.pdf?Ope
nElement (accessed 8 June 2009). 
 
United Nations Security Council.  “Resolution 1844 (2008).” 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/611/31/PDF/N0861131.pdf?Ope
nElement (accessed 8 June 2009). 
 
United Nations Security Council.  “Resolution 1846 (2008).” 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/630/29/PDF/N0863029.pdf?Ope
nElement (accessed 8 June 2009). 
 
United Nations Security Council.  “Resolution 1851 (2008).” 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/665/01/PDF/N0865501.pdf?Ope
nElement (accessed 8 June 2009). 
 
United Nations Security Council.  “Resolution 1853 (2008).” 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/663/27/PDF/N0866327.pdf?Ope
nElement (accessed 8 June 2009). 
 
United Nations Security Council.  “Security Council Decides States, Regional 
Organizations May Use ‘All Necessary Means’ to Fight Piracy Off Somalia Coast 
for 12-Month Period.” http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9514.doc.htm  
(accessed 8 June 2009). 
 
United States Department of Defense.  “DoD News Briefing With Secretary Gates From 
the Pentagon.”  
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396 (accessed 
22 October 2009). 
 
United States Department of Defense. “The Implementation of Network-Centric 
Warfare.”http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_387_NCW_Book
_LowRes.pdf  (accessed 21 May 2009). 
 
United States Department of Defense.  “Military Dictionary, Definition of Terrorism.” 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dodict/data/t05461.html  (accessed 17 September 
2008). 
 
United States Department of Homeland Security – United States Coast Guard.   
“Statement by Adm. Thad Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard, on Piracy.” 





United States Department of State.  “Announcement of Counter-Piracy Initiatives”. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/04/121758.htm  (accessed 26 April 
2009). 
 
United States Department of State.  “Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia.” 
 http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/contactgroup/  (accessed 19 October 2009). 
 
United States Department of State.  “Maritime Security and Navigation.”   
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/opa/maritimesecurity/  (accessed 19 October 
2009). 
 
United States Department of State.  “The United States Response to Piracy Off the Coast 
of Somalia.”  http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/c32662.htm  (accessed 19 
October 2009). 
 
United States Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Submarine Warfare 
Division.  “Submarine Themes:  Denied Areas.  The Submarine’s Ability to 
Prepare and Control the Battlespace Will be Vital to Successful 21st Century 
Naval Warfare.”  http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/themes/denied.html 
(accessed 14 June 2009). 
 
United States Department of the Navy.  “Combined Task Force 150.” 
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/command/ctf150.html  (accessed 22 May 2009). 
 
United States Department of the Navy.  “JHSV vs. LCS.” 
http://peoships.crane.navy.mil/FAQ_JHSV_vs_LCS.htm  (accessed 14 June 
2009). 
 
United States Department of the Navy. “What is FORCEnet?”  
 http://forcenet.navy.mil/fn-definition.htm  (accessed 22 May 2009). 
 
The United States Library of Congress.  “111th Congress, First Session H.R. 2984.” 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:hr2984  (accessed 22 June 2009). 
 
The United Library of Congress.  “111th Congress, First Session S. Res. 108.” 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c111:1:./temp/~c111qfBSCW  (accessed 
22 June 2009). 
 
 
 
